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EAST EUROPE, 1981

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Coming Next Month

West Europe, 1981

In our May, 1981, issue, seven contributors discuss the changing economic and political conditions in West Europe. Topics include:

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France

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West Germany

by GERARD BRAUNTHAL, University of Massachusetts

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Portugal

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Greece

by MARIOS EVRIVIADES, Cyprus Embassy

ERRATUM: The editors regret an error that appeared on page 98 in our March, 1981, issue. The March, 1981, issue of *Current History* is vol. 80, no. 464, not no. 463.

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Current History

APRIL, 1981

VOL. 80, NO. 465

The nations of East Europe have seen radical changes in recent years: Yugoslavia is under new leadership since the death of President Josip Broz Tito; in Poland, the labor unions are confronting the government to gain new freedoms with the specter of the Soviet Union just beyond their borders. In this issue, seven specialists examine the problems that face these nations. Our introductory article examines the two Germanys, pointing out that "the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany represent a divided Germany and symbolize a world divided between the embattled and sometimes crumbling superpower blocs."

The Germanys and the Superpowers: A Return to Cold War?

BY ARTHUR M. HANHARDT, JR.

Professor of Political Science, University of Oregon

FOR several reasons, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany, the GDR) is an important member of the Soviet bloc. First, because of its geographic position, the GDR considers itself one of the "front line" countries in the confrontation between the capitalist West and the socialist East. A front line mentality has developed among the East German leadership that tends to exaggerate political issues and to invest them with confrontational significance.

A second reason for the importance of the GDR is its economic position in the Soviet bloc. Although the economic miracle of the West German Federal Republic (FGR) is well known, East Germany, in its turn, has developed from an exploited Soviet zone of occupation to one of the "10 leading industrial nations of the world." This is a remarkable accomplishment for a country of 17 million people with virtually no natural resources within its Tennessee-sized territory.

Finally, East Germany has become the Soviet Union's closest and most devoted ally. Because of its location and economic significance, the GDR looms large in the plans and policies of the Kremlin. The Soviet Union has about 20 divisions stationed in the

GDR and the East German National People's Army is the best equipped and trained of the non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) partners. In confrontations with the West, East Europe and, increasingly, in the third world, the GDR plays the role of the Soviet Union's significant, albeit junior, partner.

How did East Germany reach its current prominence?¹ The GDR was formally founded in October, 1949, in the Soviet zone, shortly after the West German republic had been established, uniting the three Western zones of occupation. Along with the city of Berlin, the division of the former German Reich led to a seemingly unending—and indeed, unended—series of disputes over the status of the two states and of the more abstract German nation. Essentially, the argument concerns whether or not Germany has been irreconcilably split into capitalist and socialist states while the unity of a single German nation continues. The Bonn Republic of West Germany traditionally presumed to speak for all Germany, while the GDR has insisted that it is the "first socialist nation on German soil," complete with GDR citizenship and internationally recognized sovereignty.

From the start, the East German political leadership made the Soviet system its model and example. The agricultural sector was socialized and extensively collectivized with a drive that ended at the turn of the 1960's. Industry in the GDR was also reorganized to accord with the Soviet model, although there were efforts in the 1960-1964 period to loosen the grip of

¹For other discussions see my "The German Democratic Republic," in *Current History*, vol. 74, no. 436 (April, 1978), pp. 172-75ff and "The German Democratic Republic," in T. Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, eds., *Government and Politics in Eastern Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 121-44.

central economic plans with the New Economic System, an experiment that could not withstand the efforts of the entrenched orthodox leadership to revise it out of existence.

The drive to emulate the Soviet model in East Germany is led by the state party, the Socialist Unity party of Germany (SED). The Communist party of Germany had reemerged in the occupied Germany of 1945, but the party did not do well in early elections and was forcibly united with the Social Democratic party of Germany (SPD) in 1946 in an attempt to broaden its base of support. The new SED, under Walter Ulbricht and, subsequently, Erich Honecker, has ruled the GDR along with several other "bloc parties," like the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats. These parties share platforms but virtually no power in the SED.

Finally, by way of background, it is necessary to understand that the GDR has dealt with problems unique among its East European neighbors. Until the Berlin Wall of 1961, the GDR suffered a large emigration. Talented, educated and young people could leave the GDR, and many did, making orderly economic development difficult. No other country in East Europe is exposed to as much Western influence as the GDR. West German television and radio reach all but small portions of East Germany. Millions of West Germans and West Berliners visited the GDR in the 1970's; the impact of the West on the GDR is hard to minimize. And the GDR economy is almost completely dependent on the Soviet Union for crucial raw materials, including petroleum and natural gas.²

BACKGROUND FACTORS

How do these background factors affect East Germany today? Raw material dependence on the Soviet Union has not shielded East Germany from the problems of the international economy. In trading agreements, Soviet leaders have raised prices for raw materials while dampening price hikes for imports from the GDR. This has put East Germany in a considerable bind, because it has promised its people stable prices for necessities and staples. Enormous subsidies are required in order to keep domestic prices down. The money for these subsidies must come from somewhere, but the hoped-for relief in the form of trade with the capitalist West has not been forthcoming to the extent expected by East German plan-

²Siegfried Kupper, "Geplante Stagnation, Zur zukünftigen Entwicklung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen DDR-Sowjetunion," *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 13, no. 3 (March, 1980), pp. 225-28.

³See my "East Germany: From Goals to Realities," in Ivan Volgyes, ed., *Political Socialization in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 66-91.

⁴This point is made by Melvin Croan in "New Country, Old Nationality," *Foreign Policy*, no. 3 (winter, 1978-79), p. 149.

ners. In other terms, the "Polish problem" is potentially a factor in East Germany also, should prices be allowed to climb without concomitant wage increases.

Internally, the GDR must cope with expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction concerning contemporary East German life. The "export" of the dissatisfied effectively ended on August 13, 1961. Thereafter, the dissatisfied either turned inward (inner immigration) or gave expression to their thoughts regardless of the consequences. The most significant of the latter, people like Wolf Biermann, SED functionary Rudolf Bahro and several literary figures who published without permission in the West, were virtually expelled from the GDR and have taken up residence in West Germany where they continue to work, publish and to influence people in the GDR, via television and radio broadcasts.

Those turning inward, turning toward private and personal concerns, are also a problem for an East German leadership that encourages broad, militant and public support for state and party. Religion is having a comeback in the officially atheistic GDR, especially among the young. The family, which was put under pressure by party policies, continues to thrive as a refuge from state-sponsored activism.³

Ironically, the economic success the GDR scored in becoming a leading industrial state has caused problems for the political leadership. As the Soviet bloc country with the highest standard of living, East Germany is widely envied. The difficulty for the SED leadership is that the East German public compare their consumer standards with West Germany, not Poland or the Soviet Union.⁴ There is constant pressure on the regime to respond with high quality consumer goods. This is difficult, since Western goods that can fill the demand require Western currencies that are hard to come by in the pressed East German economy of the early 1980's.

Western currency goes to East Germany from relatives in West Germany, creating a stratum of people in East Germany who can buy in the hard currency Intershops stocked with Western goods. Even though Western currency must now be traded for coupons to buy in Intershops, access to hard currencies tend to divide East German citizens into haves and have-nots, adding to internal tensions.

The overriding East German goal is to achieve political parity with West Germany, to have GDR citizenship fully recognized and to negotiate an exchange of ambassadors between Bonn and East Berlin, replacing the permanent representatives. This goal has eluded two generations of GDR leadership and it is not now close to realization. Moreover, the notion that full "national statehood" would confer upon the GDR the loyalty and support of its people may be an illusion. In spite of its achievements in public welfare and education, the East German sys-

tem must adopt policies that will grant the regime greater legitimacy and more popular support.

International relations are of vital importance to the GDR at several levels: East Germany must "live with" West Germany and relate to the United States as head of a hostile power bloc, while orienting itself toward the Soviet Union as leader of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). All this must take into account the fact that the glow of détente between East and West appears to be fading, partly as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁵

East German relations with West Germany have been a sore point for over 30 years.⁶ The FRG has traditionally posed as speaker for *all* of Germany on the grounds that the only free elections after World War II were held in the West. West Germany consequently formulated as foreign policy the Hallstein Doctrine of the 1950's, which held that states forming ties with East Germany would have to forfeit diplomatic and economic relations with West Germany.

A significant foreign policy goal of the GDR was to break out of its isolation and obtain worldwide recognition as a sovereign state. Today, the GDR has full diplomatic relations with all but a handful of the world's states (exceptions include Israel and Chile). The GDR owes its recognition in large measure to the West German policy of *Ostpolitik* and détente, which replaced the Hallstein Doctrine in the 1970's.

Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) came into its own when Willy Brandt (SPD) became West German Chancellor in 1969. He wanted to improve and broaden relations with the Soviet Union and East Europe, while negotiating a "Treaty on the Basis of Relations" between the FRG and GDR (1972). The treaty was to have the effect of improving the conditions of the East German population through better relations between the two German states. The movement of people and increased trade improved the quality of life for GDR citizens, especially those with West German relatives. And the East German economy as a whole benefited from generous West German credits and duty-free access to European Economic Community

⁵The GDR follows the Soviet line that there was no invasion or intervention in Afghanistan. See Angelika Bator, "Die Aenderung des Aussenpolitischen Kurses der Carter Regierung und die Verschaerfung der Lage im Nahen und Mittleren Osten," in *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, vol. 25, no. 6 (June, 1980), pp. 86-88.

⁶For a West German overview of GDR foreign relations, see H.A. Jacobsen, et al., *Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1979). For a U.S. interpretations see W.F. Hanrieder and G.A. Auton, *The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), chs. 1-4.

⁷"Sanktionen treffen nur die Buerger," in *Der Spiegel*, vol. 34, no. 43 (October 20, 1980), pp. 17-24.

⁸Erich Honecker, *Current Issues of GDR Foreign Policy*, no. 5 (1980), pp. 14-15.

(EEC) markets through the FRG, which argued that inter-German trade was in fact intra-German trade for EEC purposes.

The movement of Germans in both directions across the East-West border led to grave problems for the SED. The leadership responded with a policy of *Abgrenzung* (demarcation) to fend off unwanted Western influence. Party members were ordered not to meet with West German visitors. Those privy to ill-defined "state secrets" were likewise denied Western contacts. The crackdown on dissidents is a continuing part of this effort to minimize Western influences and to maximize domestic SED control.

Inter-German relations took a sharp downturn in October, 1980, when the GDR announced a doubling of the amount of money Westerners must exchange for East Marks for each day spent in the GDR. The new figure is 25 Marks (East) per day per person (with the exception of young children). In one stroke, the GDR leadership hoped to halve the number of Western visitors bearing unwanted ideas, while at the same time holding hard currency income constant.

The policy appears to be having the desired effect. Western visits to the GDR have plummeted. At the same time, reprisals from West Germany have been insignificant. The government of Helmut Schmidt (reelected just one week before the announcement of the doubled per diem exchange) has maintained that counterpressures on the GDR through the suspension of credits, for example, would only burden the people in East Germany without affecting those in power.⁷

The SED move to chill relations with the FRG was announced in a speech by SED General Secretary Erich Honecker in Gera on the occasion of the inauguration of the 1980-1981 Party School Year. This was a hard-line speech accusing the West Germans of systematically abusing the "Treaty on the Basis of Relations" in an effort to undermine the status quo in the relations between East and West. In the speech, Honecker made it clear that the new chill in German-German relations was a reflection of the state of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁸

The process of détente, whose advent powerful sections of big business were forced despite fierce resistance to accept . . . has obviously resulted in something quite different from what they had hoped for in keeping with their hostility to socialism. . . . Nor can anyone fail to be aware that the Western clamor about the alleged "threat from the East" and the so-called "Soviet menace" swelled in volume at a time when the imperialist plans for the abandonment of détente, for NATO's accelerated arms buildup and for new, aggressive steps by the United States and its allies in the way of "euro" and nuclear strategy had long since been drawn up.

In other words, the end of détente came not as a result

of Soviet actions in Afghanistan, but rather because its demise suited the plans of the imperialists.

Although never well defined, in the 1970's, détente in United States-Soviet relations generally meant economic, political and cultural cooperation accompanied by and bringing about a reduction of tensions between the superpowers and their blocs. The Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (1969), SALT I (1971), the Helsinki Accords (1975) and the Vladivostok Agreements (1976) were significant political and military mileposts along the road toward improved East-West relations. At the same time, some critics held that détente was little more than the cold war fought by other means, and they pointed to the slowness of SALT negotiations, Soviet activity in Africa and other markers, showing that the path of United States-Soviet confrontation had not fundamentally changed.⁹

Whichever interpretation is adopted, it is clear that what has been called détente has changed dramatically. Beginning with President Jimmy Carter's human rights offensive of 1977 and culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, a series of events both chilled and undermined détente.

THE NEW DETENTE

This new situation affected both the FRG and the GDR. The FRG has pursued a policy of "divisible détente," that is, while there is one détente between the superpowers, there is another between West Germany and the Soviet Union/GDR. This policy has enabled the FRG to continue its high level of trade with and credits to the Soviet Union in spite of Afghanistan. And the same policy mandated the calm West German response to the GDR measures of October, 1980: business remained much as usual, although by December East and West German leaders were exchanging threats that may eventually escalate the confrontation with a mutual imposition of sanctions.¹⁰

For its part, East Germany has become increasingly involved in supporting Soviet policies in Africa and the Middle East. The East German "Afrika Korps" has been active in Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique and Zambia, providing expert assistance in internal security matters and technical assistance in military communications.¹¹ In the Middle East, GDR advisers have been active in Yemen. East German propaganda for Soviet positions has been loud and has been used in an attempt to rally popular support for the Freedom Fighters of the third

⁹S.J. Artner, "Détente Policy Before and After Afghanistan," in *Aussenpolitik* (English edition), vol. 31, no. 2 (2d quarter, 1980), p. 135.

¹⁰"Dann bewegt sich zwischen uns gar nichts," in *Der Spiegel*, vol. 34, no. 50 (December 8, 1980), pp. 19-21.

¹¹"Wir haben euch Waffen und Brot geschickt," in *Der Spiegel*, vol. 34, no. 10 (March 3, 1980), pp. 42-61.

¹²Honecker, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

world. Clearly, East German enthusiasm for the Soviet line is conditioned by the encouragement colder attitudes between East and West provide for the policy of domestic demarcation vis-à-vis the FRG.

Generally, the present GDR leadership, in its relations with the West, concedes as little as possible within the realities of a strict cost-benefit analysis. That is, the GDR attempts to exact as much as it can in the way of trade, hard currency loans, technology and recognition, while yielding few points relative to the movement of people and ideas (*à la Helsinki*). The winds of the cold war are useful to the East German leadership in that they conjure up an external enemy that can be used to encourage internal solidarity.

In relating to the East, the GDR has built up its position as a junior partner of the Soviet Union and as an increasingly important factor in the Soviet bloc. These tendencies can be observed in the East German response to the current Polish crisis.

THE GDR AND THE POLISH CRISIS

The timing of the October freeze in East German policies toward the West was conditioned by two factors: the West German federal election and events in Poland. The East Germans wanted to hold off any unnecessary chill until Chancellor Schmidt was safely reelected on October 5, 1980. Although Erich Honecker has no particular love for Helmut Schmidt, the alternative prospect of a Chancellor Franz Joseph Strauss was anathema. In fact, Honecker noted in his Gera speech that the West Germans "have given the incumbent coalition government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats another four-year term. This is to be seen in an absolutely positive light."¹² Honecker went on to invite continuation of a one-sided détente in German-German relations, with the benefits flowing toward the East.

The events in neighboring Poland were weighty in the decision to pursue GDR demarcation policies with greater vigor. Elements of the "Polish disease" are present in the GDR: there are upward pressures on domestic prices held artificially low by SED policy, along with internal dissent and dissatisfaction. Moreover, the SED is in the position of having to worry about two "fronts." The dangers from Western

(Continued on page 179)

Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., has had a longstanding interest in the politics of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and is the author of *The German Democratic Republic* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968). He has contributed to several volumes on the politics of East Europe, most recently *Communism in Eastern Europe*, by T. Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, eds. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979). He visited East Germany in 1970, 1972 and 1974 and last visited West Germany in 1980.

"In 1981, Poland seems to be on the threshold of change. The ruling party is faced with a choice: either permit limited participation . . . in the decision-making process or continue along the road leading to economic chaos . . ."

The Opposition Movement in Poland

BY RICHARD F. STAAR

Director, International Studies Program, Hoover Institution

THE events which took place in Poland during October, 1956, and December, 1970, each time leading to changes in the leadership of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) party, involved outbursts of popular discontent.* They laid the foundations for what has become one of the most extensive manifestations of opposition to the Soviet Union in any country in East Central Europe. The Final Act, signed at Helsinki by the heads of 35 governments at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on August 1, 1975, also served to intensify the struggle for human and citizenship rights in Poland. This document, printed by regime newspapers, was used by dissenters as one of the official justifications for protesting repeated violation of its principles.

Before the end of that Helsinki year, the first example of successful pressure exerted by intellectuals took place in connection with proposed amendments to the 1952 Polish constitution. A draft of these changes included language about placing greater emphasis on Poland's "eternal alliance" with the U.S.S.R., using such expressions as "unshakeable fraternal bonds with the Soviet Union," describing the one-party dictatorship as the "leading force" in all aspects of Polish life, and linking citizens' rights with honest fulfillment of duties toward the motherland. These specific phrases were opposed in a December, 1975, letter, known as the "Manifesto of the 59," sent to the speaker of Parliament or Sejm. Other, similar communications were signed by approximately 300 professors, students and legal experts.

A statement by Roman Catholic bishops subse-

quently revealed that the church hierarchy had also raised objections with the government regarding the draft amendments. Both laymen and clergy based their case on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Final Act signed at Helsinki. The regime in Warsaw, forced by public pressure, finally made concessions. The Sejm passed new amendments that changed the wording to read "inviolable fraternal bonds . . ." and referred to the party as a "guiding political force in the construction of socialism." Citizens' duties were confined to honest fulfillment of duties to the motherland, but civil rights were no longer made dependent on such conduct.¹

During the following summer, the government announced that food prices would be raised. The price increases would have added 39 percent to the total food bill of an average family, which already was spending about 60 percent of its income on food. It seemed inevitable that massive public disapproval would follow, and demonstrations did take place. Although the government rescinded the order within 24 hours, many workers were arrested. This led to the formation of the Committee for Defense of Workers (KOR), organized by 14 intellectuals to aid victims of these June, 1976, events. KOR succeeded in raising funds and providing assistance to strikers' families; largely through its efforts, one year later all jailed strikers had been released.² By mid-1978, membership had grown to 31 participants, mostly from the student movement of 1968 but including some prewar social democrats. KOR also expanded its activities to include publications, demands for civil and human rights in Poland, and concerted appeals in cooperation with dissenters from other Communist-ruled states like the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia.

A year after the food riots, the Movement for Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) came into being, established by 18 dissidents in Warsaw. Two months later, it claimed to have about 1,000 supporters. ROPCiO differs from KOR in that its members are essentially less politicized and more anti-Soviet and have no Marxist leanings. It offers legal assistance to dissidents and publishes the monthly *Opinia*. Even though both KOR and ROPCiO were established and continue to function under the written laws of Poland, arrests, harassments and discrimina-

*The author expresses his gratitude for a travel grant from the American Council of Learned Societies which enabled him to present a paper on this subject at the Second World Congress on Soviet and East European Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Federal Republic of Germany, on September 30, 1980. This is a revised and expanded version of that paper.

¹L. Stachow, "The Struggle for Democracy in Poland," paper submitted at the Leeds Castle Conference on May 11-13, 1979 (London). The new constitutional phraseology appeared in *Dziennik ustaw*, no. 5 (February 10, 1976).

²Walter D. Connor, "Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?" *Problems of Communism*, vol. 29, no. 1 (January-February, 1980), p. 8.

tion have continued to affect their membership.³

At the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, mass resignations from the regime-controlled Socialist Union of Polish Students resulted during May, 1977, in the emergence of a Student Solidarity Committee (SKS) which announced its support for KOR. Branches have been formed in other cities, including Warsaw, Poznan and Wroclaw. Some estimates state that similar committees exist in every university in the country. These groups serve as alternative student organizations to those controlled by the state. SKS now publishes two papers, *Bratniak* and *Indeks*.

Just as students sought to form an independent organization which would better reflect their views, the workers also sought less centralized unions to represent them. The history of Polish trade unions illustrates the fact that the industrial proletariat has had a heritage of largely democratic unionization. From their beginnings in the nineteenth century to the end of the 1930's, these labor unions expanded to a total number of some 300 different units. Before the end of World War II, they reached a record high of about one million members and exercised considerable political influence.⁴ However, when the Communists solidified their control over the country, the unions were first amalgamated into 36 and then brought down to 23 by the mid-1970's. Demands for free trade unions have resounded since the 1976 food riots. They have met with opposition from Communist officials who retort that "there are no and cannot be any antagonistic conflicts between the [state controlled] workers' organizations and the economic and state administration."⁵ Despite repression, at least four independent trade unions were functioning by October, 1979, although none would be recognized by the regime in Warsaw until the following year.

When discussing opposition in Poland, it is impossible to avoid mentioning the Catholic Church. It holds a highly influential position vis-à-vis the government, because of its historic continuity and its large following among the population (some estimates give

³See, e.g., translation of a special directive from the attorney general in Warsaw to his functionaries in the provinces, describing tactics used to neutralize dissidents. *The Times* (London), November 27, 1980.

⁴J.B. de Weydenthal, "Workers' Dilemma in Polish Politics: A Case Study," *East European Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (spring, 1979), pp. 98-99.

⁵Speech by Council of Trade Unions chairman Wladyslaw Kruczek to its 7th congress, as published by *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), November 14, 1972, pp. 5-6.

⁶Paris interview with Edward Lipiński in December, 1977, as published by *Orzel bialy* (London), February, 1978, p. 22.

⁷Xavier Mooshütter, "Polens Nachbar im Westen: Deutschland," *Osteuropa*, February, 1979, pp. 137-146.

⁸Edward Hughes, "Poland's Rising Tide of Dissent," *Reader's Digest*, May, 1979, p. 165.

the number of believers at more than 90 percent). Many dissidents consider the Church a traditional symbol of antitotalitarianism. Increasingly, spokesmen for the Episcopate have come out in support of worker demands, especially during the 1976 and the more recent 1980-1981 strikes.

PROLIFERATION OF DISSENT

Already in March, 1977, the Movement for Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) published a five-point program. This additional pressure, together with that from the Church hierarchy, probably brought about the July 22 amnesty which led to the release of practically all imprisoned demonstrators and KOR members as well. This last organization added "Committee of Social Defense" (KSS) to its previous name, assuming a broader objective: the struggle against repression due to world outlook, race, religion, politics as well as for institutional guarantees of civil rights and freedoms.⁶

Yet another group, Polish Independence Compact (PPN), began to undertake studies and analyze basic problems. It published a document entitled "Poland and Germany" (1977), in which regime propaganda against Germany was condemned. PPN contacts abroad include exiled intellectuals who live in England, Italy and the United States.⁷ It issues an irregularly appearing publication, *PPN: Polskie Porozumienie Niepodleglosciowe*, but contributors remain anonymous.

Other organizations that have sprung up during the past few years should be mentioned: a branch of Amnesty International, an anti-abortion Polish Committee for Defense of Life and Family, which publishes *Samoobrona polska*, and the Society for Academic Courses. In addition, there are clandestine organizations, like the Polish League for Independence, and periodicals like *Polska walczaca*, named for a wartime underground resistance movement. Peasant self-help committees, formed in the summer of 1978 primarily throughout central and southwestern parts of Poland, have waged successful campaigns to achieve such limited goals as paving village streets, modernizing a fire station, or draining a village meadow. They publish *Gospodarz*, which emphasizes opposition to collectivized agriculture.

Almost all of the uncensored newspapers and periodicals list the names of their editors and contributors. The more than 50 titles represent a multiplicity of views and address specific audiences: intellectuals, students, farmers, industrial workers, women, young Catholics and scholars. One estimate suggests that the combined circulation totals 25,000 to 30,000; each copy may be read by 100 individuals.⁸ This would make a readership of 2.5 million to 3 million, even taking into account the fact that almost half of each printing may be confiscated by the police.

Table 1: Polish Victims of Soviet Repression

Category	Number taken	Number of survivors	Number deceased
prisoners of war	230,000	82,000	148,000
civilians in the GULAG	1,600,000	1,000,000	600,000
executed at Katyn Forest, et al.	12,000	none	12,000
Totals:	1,842,000	1,082,000	760,000

In an apparent attempt to channel at least the intellectual dissent, the regime permitted the establishment of a discussion club called "Experience and the Future" (DiP), which held its first and only meeting on November 14, 1978, in Warsaw. About 100 scholars, writers, economists and artists had been invited to discuss current social problems. Included were non-party intellectuals and well-known Catholic writers. One of those in attendance was Mieczyslaw Rakowski, editor of the regime weekly *Polityka*. The second meeting, scheduled for January, 1979, did not take place. Hopes that DiP might help with advice in the formulation of government policy remained abortive.

Rakowski subsequently gave an interview to an Italian newspaper correspondent in which he claimed that the unidentified individual⁹ who had organized the DiP discussion did so without authorization from the ruling Communist party to establish contacts with the opposition (the question might have been asked why Rakowski was present). He admitted that the Communists did not like the various uncensored bulletins and publications. However, regime policy, according to Rakowski, opposed the imprisonment and trial of dissidents.¹⁰

One could accept this statement as true at that time, especially when no repercussions occurred after the following events: Wojciech Ziembicki made an anti-Soviet speech to approximately 4,000 persons commemorating the 35th anniversary of the abortive Warsaw uprising; Leon Moczulski announced at a rally attended by about 3,000 individuals that his League for an Independent Poland would be publishing a weekly newspaper by the spring of 1980; other speakers denounced the Hitler-Stalin pact and the partition of Poland. On the fortieth anniversary of the Red Army invasion (September 17), KSS-KOR issued a document accusing the Soviet Union of genocide and called for an international tribunal to investigate U.S.S.R. war crimes (see Table 1).¹¹

These incidents all occurred in Warsaw, where they

⁹According to rumors in Warsaw, Politburo member Stefan Olszowski authorized this meeting and continued to use DiP membership subsequently as a sounding board.

¹⁰*Corriere della Serra* (Milan), March 5, 1979.

¹¹*Le Monde* (Paris), September 19, 1979.

¹²See note 3 above.

¹³Leopold Unger, "Grounding Poland's Flying University," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), December 14, 1979.

¹⁴Connor, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 and 17.

were covered by foreign correspondents, and that might explain the absence of police repression.¹²

However, in the case of the Society for Academic Courses (TKN), which had spread to cities other than Warsaw, the ruling party cracked down ruthlessly. Launched at the beginning of 1978 with a faculty of 81, including 19 full professors and 6 members of the Polish Academy of Sciences, the "flying university" reached approximately 5,000 students in Warsaw, Krakow, Wroclaw, Lodz and Poznan before it was all but closed down by the secret police. It had organized public lectures, seminars and discussion groups on subjects never taught at the regime-controlled universities.¹³ Currently, TKN assumes a low profile. Lectures are no longer publicized, and study groups gather secretly in private apartments. A general meeting of the society reportedly took place secretly on June 14, 1980, in Warsaw, where plans were made for the next academic year.

OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS

The immediate concern of the organized opposition in Poland centered at first on human rights. Publicizing violations of law by regime authorities and police brutality, together with providing legal advice and financial assistance to the families of those imprisoned, certainly contributed to the pressure that brought about amnesty for demonstrators. The continuation of uncensored bulletins, newspapers and magazines broke the regime's monopoly control over the printed media. None of this led to any political or social pluralism, however.

The gradual extension of civil liberties and human rights appeared to be the objective of all opposition groups. The main problem involved the fact that the most important organizations were comprised solely of intellectuals, although KSS-KOR did publish *Robotnik*, which attempted to represent working class interests. All dissidents, the Marxists included, supported independent trade unions. An alliance between intellectuals and the industrial proletariat theoretically could have led to change, but such inter-class cooperation appeared to be unlikely until July, 1980.¹⁴

The two main opposition groups among intellectuals could not themselves unite, perhaps because they were so disparate in composition. Membership and support for KSS-KOR included former orthodox Marxists, so-called revisionists, old social democrats and young Catholics. This last category comprised the Catholic Intelligentsia Club in Warsaw, which

had been politicized during the mid-1970's. A KSS-KOR spokesman and former orthodox Marxist, Adam Michnik, at one time had apologized for the anti-religious activities of the left, calling the Church the only antitotalitarian social force in Poland.¹⁵ This made it easier for young Catholics to join the movement. Another formerly orthodox Marxist, Jacek Kuron, stated in a *Le Monde* interview during the same year that reforms can only come from above, i.e., be initiated by the Polish United Workers' (Communist) party. Hence, the instability even of the KSS-KOR coalition.

Members of the other major opposition group, ROPCiO, have fewer ideological constraints but are more militant and anti-Soviet. Some had belonged to the "Movement" (Ruch) group in 1968, charged with an abortive attempt to blow up the Lenin monument. They offer legal assistance in Warsaw and Lodz but are not supported by the Catholic Church. KSS-KOR accuses them of nationalism and indirect collaboration with the regime. ROPCiO charges its accusers of being ex-Communists who have converted to Christianity as a tactic.¹⁶ A few smaller groups include Bratniak, located at Gdansk on the Baltic Coast. It functioned at the grassroots level among dock workers and held a rally in December, 1979, to commemorate the ninth anniversary of the strike that brought Edward Gierek to power. KSS-KOR publications reported the mass meeting and speeches, yet Bratniak was not mentioned. Leaders of that organization had been described by Jacek Kuron as possessing an "endek"¹⁷ mentality. (This is an example of using a label to slander another opposition group, hardly conducive to unity.) One organization among dissenters, the Independent Peasant Movement, has the support of private entrepreneur farmers who own approximately 80 percent of the arable land in Poland. Inspired by traditions from the pre- and immediately post-war *Stronnictwo Ludowe* (Peasant party), it is behind the self-defense committees in rural areas. One of these at Zbroza Wielka, led by the village priest, launched a milk strike in December, 1979, to protest the old age retirement law.

Although it is difficult to sort out developments

¹⁵"Rozmowa Kisiel-Michnik," *Kultura* (Paris), May, 1978, pp. 10-15.

¹⁶Much of the following is based on an unpublished manuscript by Jadwiga Staniszakis, "Dialectics of a Socialist Society: The Case of Poland," being reviewed for possible publication as a book.

¹⁷Signifies pre-1939 *Stronnictwo Narodowe* (National party), anathema to leftist intellectuals.

¹⁸See the interview with Jacek Kuron in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), August 4, 1980, pp. 98-100.

¹⁹The *New York Times*, August 18, 1980.

²⁰*Glos pracy* (Warsaw), September 2, 1980, pp. 2 and 4, carried the full agreement with addenda.

²¹Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, *Dissent in Poland: December 1975-July 1977* (London: 1977).

immediately after July 2, 1980, when higher food prices were announced retroactively to the day before, there are indications that intellectuals served as a link with the foreign press regarding information about strikes throughout Poland.¹⁸ These activities led to the arrest of KOR spokesmen, although most of those involved were released. Many of the individual strikes were settled quickly, when regime representatives promised 15 to 20 percent wage increases.

However, the crisis reached its high point only after 17,000 workers at Gdansk laid down their tools and took over the Lenin shipyard on August 14, in an occupation strike. They issued a list of 21 demands which included the following:¹⁹

- reopening of all communication links with Gdansk,
- the right to strike,
- freedom of expression and abolition of censorship,
- release of all political prisoners,
- the right to establish free trade unions,
- access by all religious groups to the mass media,
- informing the public fully about the socioeconomic situation and allowing discussion of reforms,
- abolition of privileges for the security services and of special shops [open only to police and party officials],
- full supplies on the domestic market, with only surplus commodities exported,
- meat rationing to make the market stable,
- average salary increases of 2,000 zlotys (\$66) for everyone,
- publication on radio, television, and in the newspapers of information about the strikes and establishment of the strike committee.

Ten days later, Prime Minister Edward Babiuch and several other government officials resigned. Party boss Edward Gierek promised new trade union elections, with a secret ballot and unlimited candidates. A week before his replacement, on August 31, 1980, a protocol of agreement was signed at Gdansk by a government commission and the Interfactory Strike Committee.²⁰

What, if anything, had been learned from the past, and how are these lessons being applied during the 1980-1981 crisis? Ten years ago, industrial workers had shown their displeasure at first by slow-downs and general inefficiency, even before the December 13, 1970, announcement that food prices would be increased from 10 to 30 percent. This subsequently triggered demonstrations at shipyards in Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin, which spread to the steel plant at Nowa Huta near Krakow and to factories in Warsaw itself.²¹ In Gdynia alone, 28 persons were killed during the first riots. Another 21 died when police fired on workers returning to the Paris Commune shipyard in response to a radio appeal. Similar events took place in other cities. Edward Gierek, who had replaced Wladyslaw Gomulka as party leader on December 20, promised to withdraw the new system of incentives but not the price increases. Four weeks later, work stopped again at Gdansk and Szczecin. This time, demands included the release of those

Table 2: Expenditures for Secret and Uniformed Police

Calendar year	Budget in zlotys (millions)
1971	7,380
1974	14,457
1980 (plan)	28,231

arrested, a 20 percent raise in wages, and independent trade unions. Strikes spread to Elblag, Zyrardow, Poznan and Warsaw.²²

The regime announced suspension of the new five-year plan, including the previously announced higher production norms, for the next 12 months. However, neither the wage increases nor repeal of the higher food prices went into effect. After several weeks of relative quiet, approximately 10,000 textile workers (mostly women) struck on February 13, 1971, at Lodz. They were followed by city transit employees. Five days later, the government canceled food price increases and gave shipyard workers higher wages. By the end of the following year, the latter were granted also to those employed in other industries.²³

When the next crisis arose in June, 1976, after the regime in Warsaw had again announced that it would raise food prices, the authorities reversed themselves within a period of only 24 hours (the 1970-1971 strikes had lasted exactly two months). This time, police did not fire on demonstrators at Radom or Ursus. Workers had learned that large crowds provide relative security via anonymity. However, in 1976 there was only limited solidarity, despite the fact that dismissal from work took place on a much larger scale than had been the case during 1970-1971. Yet no response in the form of further strikes occurred. Workers had probably begun to realize that they have the power to force a reversal of decisions affecting their livelihood.

That the regime had been ready to use force and, if necessary, may do so in the future, can be seen from the official budget figures for the uniformed police and Security Service (secret police) (see Table 2).

These figures compare with only 6.8 billion for

²²Peter Raina, *Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1977* (London: Poets and Painters Press, 1978).

²³Jacques Rupnik, "Dissent in Poland, 1968-78," in Rudolf Tökes, ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 60-112.

²⁴Sources: *Statistical Yearbook* (1971, 1974, 1978) and the 1980 budget approved by Parliament; given in Staniszakis, *op. cit.*

²⁵For his biographical sketch, see R.F. Staar, ed., *1981 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981).

²⁶Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Workers and Party in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 29, no. 6. (November-December, 1979), p. 15.

²⁷For an excellent analysis and documentation, see William F. Robinson, ed., *August 1980: The Strikes in Poland* (Munich: Radio Free Europe Research, October, 1980), pp. 447.

²⁸Tass communiqué (Moscow), September 6, 1980.

health care and 5.5 billion for culture in 1980 as planned.²⁴ This ominous trend could be reversed by the new Communist party first secretary, Stanislaw Kania, whose background involved overseeing the military and secret police for the Central Committee apparatus. He also represented the ruling party in relations with the Church, which must have given him some insight concerning power relations inside the country.²⁵

One striking development has been the change in political bureau composition, i.e., the top decision-making body. Six of the ten full members and all five candidates for membership have been elevated during 1980 to these positions. In two instances, individuals removed by former party leader Edward Gierek have returned. Stefan Olszowski, an economic expert, is one; Mieczyslaw Moczar, recently elected to head the veterans' organization, is the other.²⁶ The former may help with reforming the economy, the latter in instilling labor discipline. New policies will be submitted to an extraordinary party congress which has been announced for spring, 1981.

The question is whether Kania can maintain the Gdansk agreement without provoking Soviet military intervention. He replaced Gierek on September 6, 1980, after a prolonged series of strikes that literally paralyzed the country.²⁷ The new independent nationwide trade union called Solidarity claimed more than 10 million of the 12.5 million industrial workers, including some 800,000 Communists, as members. The very concept of a labor organization not under party control is anathema in the Soviet Union and throughout East Europe.

During this past autumn of discontent in Poland, the U.S.S.R. seemed to be conducting a two-front campaign: on the one hand, full support and solidarity among fraternal socialist countries; on the other, pressure by word and action. The first took shape during Warsaw Pact maneuvers in August, "Brotherhood-in-Arms 1980," even though Polish troops participated in reduced numbers. Next came President Leonid Brezhnev's endorsement of Kania as a staunch Communist, firmly committed to "the inviolable friendship between Poland and the Soviet Union."²⁸ The Moscow meeting of top party and government officials from Poland and the Soviet Union

(Continued on page 180)

A contributing editor of *Current History*, **Richard F. Staar** is author of *Poland, 1944-1962: Sovietization of a Captive People* (Baton Rouge, La.: LSU Press, 1962, reprinted in Westport, Ct., by Greenwood Press, 1975) and *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 3d rev. ed. (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), and is the editor of the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1981* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981).

"The spread of the Polish virus is not inevitable," notes this author, who points out that "In the case of Czechoslovakia, the country has not yet recovered from its collision with the Soviet behemoth in 1968, and it is immune, for the time being, to experimental inflammation."

Czechoslovakia and the Polish Virus

BY OTTO ULČ

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FOR Czechoslovakia the 1970's were a decade of "normalization," officially termed *realny socialismus*, a term as awkward in English translation as it is in the Czech original: meaning real, realistic, fatalistic, given once for all, in resigned acquiescence to the facts of life. The Soviet invasion in August, 1968, the largest military undertaking in Europe since World War II, convinced the Czechoslovak society that the price to be paid for any emancipatory initiative was prohibitive. Instead, an implicit social contract was formulated: the rulers rule and the citizenry is rewarded with a relatively high standard of living and the opportunity to attend to its private affairs in exchange for not meddling in public affairs. Preoccupation with consumer pleasures has become a caricature of the new socialist morality. Such a social contract does not produce any socialists; nor does it produce challengers to the existing status quo.

In May, 1980, the Federal Parliament in Prague reelected President Gustav Husak to his second term, in a ritual of predictable unanimity. The Communist party (CPCS) regained the numerical strength it had enjoyed before the big post-invasion purge. The membership base of 1,535,000 (as of January, 1970) had been reduced to some 1,200,000 (as of January, 1971). In October, 1980, Husak stated at the eighteenth plenary session of the party's Central Committee that the total of 1,532,000 members and candidate (probationary) members had been reached. The party gained almost 300,000 full members after the fifteenth congress held in 1976. According to Husak,

during the last five years [before 1980] more than 60 percent of the candidate members were blue collar workers and more than 90 percent of them were under 35 years of age.¹

The party composition has been altered indeed: each third member is a newcomer, coopted into the ranks in the post-invasion period.

Husak stressed the political and economic strength of the Czechoslovak society at the threshold of the 1980's, and emphasized the "fundamental, irreplaceable role of the trade unions, the most significant mass organization of the toiling people."² This

¹Czechoslovak Newsletter (New York), November 1980, p. 4.

²Ceske Slovo (Munich), October 1980, p. 1.

was an all too transparent attempt to reassure Moscow that the party was firmly in control and that there was no threat of a spillover of the Polish demands for independent unions.

The observers of the Czechoslovak political scene conclude that had there been no turbulence in Poland, the plenary session of the Central Committee would not have convened at all in October, 1980. The party rules require three such sessions per year, and this requirement had been met at an earlier date. The Polish virus was clearly the main item on the minds of the 300 participants in this summit conclave.

The plenum set the date for the next—the sixteenth—CPCS Congress to open on April 6, 1981, to follow the twenty-sixth congress of the Soviet Communist party, by then to be concluded in Moscow. Prague has adhered to this practice of close timing; it provides the opportunity to echo the fraternal line of the big brother. Furthermore, 1981 will be the year to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the foundation of the CPCS. After this major event, the general election will be held with the assurance of a 99 percent majority of all votes cast for all the party's hand-picked candidates.

Czechoslovakia enjoys limited sovereignty, but under the tranquil façade Czech political life is not conflict free. In addition to the clash of personalities, there is the conflict between the ideologues and hardliners represented by Vasil Bilak, and those who favor a more rational, technocratic approach to problem-solving. The Federal Prime Minister, Lubomir Strougal, is counted among the latter. However, all the infighting dwarfs in importance compared to the gulf between the rulers and the ruled. The vital interest of the political elite in preserving the status quo promotes unity of convenience and, indeed, of necessity within the leadership. Its composition has not changed during the entire decade of the 1970's; the same people occupy the positions to which they were elevated after the 1968 invasion.

Their rule is bound to be non-innovative, because they fear that innovation may contribute to the destabilization of the political system. Whatever few changes were introduced, they did not promote modernization of the system nor did they loosen the elite's

control over the society. The Higher Education Act is a case in point. Since its assumption of power, the party introduced four sweeping reforms of the educational system—in 1948, 1953, 1959 and 1976. Yet in April, 1980, the Federal Assembly adopted the fifth reform, calling for even more rigid centralization and the extirpation of the last vestiges of academic freedom dating back to the fourteenth century, during the rule of Emperor Charles IV, the founder of the university in Prague. Matej Lucan, the Deputy Federal Prime Minister, explained that the old law “paid too much attention to the outdated, so-called self-management ideas for controlling the universities.”³

Militarization is another characteristic of politicized education. National defense training is a part of the curricula, even in the elementary schools. The government journal *Socialisticka Skola* (May, 1977) explains how to insert martial themes into all the subjects of instruction—literature (poems extolling the armed forces and the border guards), history (revolutionary struggles), geography (presenting the United States as the enemy of world peace), physics (rockets), chemistry (explosives). Nor is physical education exempt: “It is a part of the ideological struggle on a global scale,” according to Antonin Himpl, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Union of Physical Education.⁴

In addition to the politicization and militarization of the schools, the party introduced a novelty: a Police University that will educate and graduate doctors of police sciences. Jaromir Obzina, the Federal Minister of the Interior (the department in charge not of national parks but of all the police in the police state) is a docent of philosophy. In June, 1978, he was the commencement speaker for the first graduating class.⁵ The Czechoslovak Police University issues academic degrees in the fields of public security, secret state security (STB, the local equivalent of the Soviet KGB), and in professional border watching.

THE ECONOMY

The picture of the world economy is far from rosy. In Czechoslovakia, the public mood is echoed in this quip:

“What is the economic outlook for this year?”

“It will be an average one—worse than the last year and better than the one to come.”

Official pronouncements are a mixture of propagandistic bombast and cautious, even gloomy predictions. Prime Minister Strougal informed the Par-

³*Nove Slovo* (Bratislava), April 24, 1980. See Vladimir Kusin, *RFE Research: RAD Situation Report/114*, May 19, 1980.

⁴*Rude Pravo*, April 12, 1980.

⁵*Rude Pravo*, June 29, 1978.

⁶*Rude Pravo*, March 17, 1980.

⁷*Czechoslovak Newsletter*, October, 1980, pp. 4-5.

⁸*Rude Pravo*, August 15, 1979.

liament in March, 1980, that the national income has grown during the 1970's by an admirable 59 percent; the industrial output was up by 75 percent; car ownership per capita had doubled.⁶ Yet at the special October, 1980, plenum of the Central Committee, triggered by the developments in Poland, Strougal presented a somber, critical account of the economy and the prospects for the forthcoming (seventh) five-year plan. The results have thus far been unsatisfactory, the trade balance with the capitalist countries unfavorable and “our ideas for our economic relations have proved to be unworkable.”⁷

Capital investment is poorly utilized, the projects under construction remain unfinished, the rate of energy consumption is 20 percent to 50 percent higher than in the Western industrial countries, and only one-fifth of Czechoslovak industrial export products meet the quality standards required on world markets. Among all the woes, energy is the main headache. Even *Rude Pravo*, the main party daily, acknowledged that “our economy is trying to solve the most difficult task since the beginning of our socialist construction.”⁸

The year 1973—the year of the Yom Kippur war and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) onslaught on the world economy—was a watershed for the Czechoslovak economy. The balance sheet turned from black to red, from surplus to deficit. Since 1973, the foreign trade balance has been chronically passive. Czechoslovakia attempted, unsuccessfully, to reverse the trend with the export of industrial consumer goods, which in volume began to exceed the export of machinery equipment. In this switch, it was domestic consumers who suffered.

Up to the mid-1970's, Czechoslovakia was encouraging the oil producing countries to raise the price of their solitary product, in the expectation that such a step would injure the capitalist orbit—which it did—and thus would benefit the socialist orbit—which it did not. The Soviet Union, too, raised the price of its oil and natural gas exports. Czechoslovakia, up to 98% dependent on the Soviet Union to meet its energy needs, was suddenly faced with the reality of dual distress: the adverse trade balance on the one hand, and the necessity to raise the prices of consumer goods, on the other—a measure thus far relegated to the nefarious practices of the capitalist system, doomed by the law of history to its accelerated demise. In July, 1979, the government nonetheless decreed that prices of several consumer goods items be raised by 50 percent. The terms “inflation” and “price rise” remain taboo. “Price adjustment” is discussed instead.

The country that was supposedly immune to inflation lost its resistance to this virulent ailment, and the official propaganda line had to be changed. According to *Rude Pravo* (July 17, 1978),

There is the impression in many quarters that the rise in the world price of fuel is of no concern to us . . . but we have to import, pay more, suffer more.

One-third of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade is with countries outside the socialist bloc. *Zivot Strany*, the Central Committee's biweekly for party members, acknowledged that

The terms of trade have developed unfavorably for us in recent years because import prices have outstripped the export prices. The situation is made worse by the recession in the West which has made it harder to sell our products there.⁹

The export of Czechoslovak engineering products declined by half in the last ten years despite the fact that the asking prices were on average one-third below those of competitors. All too frequently, the failure lies with the producer rather than with the market. Thus, for example, more than half the television sets and one-fourth of the shoes exported were returned by the foreign buyers because of quality deficiencies.¹⁰

The successful industries of prewar Czechoslovakia (leather wear, textiles, glass, porcelain) deteriorated under the Stalinist concept of "iron socialism." Heavy industry—like steel mills—require a great deal of energy and raw materials, both in short supply in Czechoslovakia. In the 1970's, Poland borrowed heavily from the West with adverse and economically almost ruinous consequences. Czechoslovakia chose the opposite extreme and shied away from Western credits to purchase modern technology. Even opportunities within the framework of what is called "the socialist division of labor" remained underutilized.

Atrophied Czechoslovak industry finds it increasingly difficult to compete not only with the capitalist producers but also with the newcomers in the socialist bloc. For instance, the Soviet-produced Fiat automobiles replaced the Czech Skoda car on West European markets. Experts seem to agree on their overall assessment of the Czechoslovak economy: the structural changes introduced since 1948 did not serve Czechoslovak interests but rather the needs of the industrialization of the East European countries and above all the interests of the Soviet economy.

However, one exception to the overall gloomy rule deserves mention. The export of Czechoslovak weapons is an increasingly shiny success. Omnipol, the state export monopoly, supplies any market, in open and clandestine trades—to third world countries, like Indonesia, Algeria and Libya, the foremost customer, to NATO member countries, like West Germany, to terrorists, like the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and

the Red Brigades in Italy. Among Omnipol's customers is the racist Republic of South Africa, otherwise a political villain par excellence. The single most successful Czechoslovak product is the Scorpion, a machine gun (50cm, 1.5 kg) with a silencer. This weapon silenced the former Italian Premier Aldo Moro.

In order to cope with the energy crisis, the government in Prague placed its bets on the nuclear card. An ambitious construction plan of eight nuclear reactors is under way. The anti-nuclear energy forces, in neighboring Austria in particular, follow this development with considerable apprehension.

Some, though not all, environmental issues have been aired in public. With regard to the protection of agricultural land, Stepan Hornik, the Deputy Premier of the Czech state government, described the situation as "alarming." Some one million hectares of agricultural land have been thus far lost during the construction of socialism, and of the land still left, 37 percent is threatened by water erosion and 29 percent by wind erosion of the soil.¹¹

Neglect of environmental protection, violation of pollution standards, excessive use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers along with the initiation of monocultural farming contribute to the destruction of the socialist habitat. The economy, too, feels the injury. Hare used to be one of Czechoslovakia's most successful export items (\$68 per live hare, sold in the West, especially in France and West Germany). The reservoir of 1,555,000 hares in 1973 shrank to a mere 70,000 in 1979. Of 1,214,000 pheasants (another source of hard currency) in 1973, not more than 100,000 could be found in 1979.¹²

In view of these figures it may come as a surprise that the farmers, the members of the agricultural cooperatives, are singled out as the least dissatisfied stratum of the society (in addition, of course, to the new class, the natural beneficiaries of the political system—the political appointees, the party and government bureaucracy, the police).

After the trauma of forcible collectivization during the 1950's, farming villages were transformed into oases beyond the reach of total bureaucratization and control of the state. Agriculture is a sector in which all the initiative cannot be stultified by an administrative fiat. If a piglet is missing, did it perish or was it part of an illicit feast? The state will never know for sure. In the countryside, the identity of police informers soon becomes known and their effectiveness declines accordingly. Rural people are oriented to strictly consumerist values and their aspirations are thoroughly apolitical. In consequence, the farming village has become the party's (and government's) pillar of stability.

As for the farming population, the social contract has been a success. Nonetheless, a question is in

⁹*Zivot Strany*, Nov. 18, 1979.

¹⁰*Nove Slovo*, July 21, 1977.

¹¹*Ceske Slovo*, May, 1980, p. 1.

¹²*Mlady Svet*, November 26, 1980, cited by *Americke Listy* (New York), September 5, 1980.

order: how long will the consumerist pacification program last—especially with regard to the industrial working class and in view of the country's growing economic woes. The trade deficit is increasing, as is the dependence on imports. The government faces the difficulty of reaching hard currency markets with industrial products, the aging industrial equipment, waste and irrationality in investment and manpower allocation, and the overall injurious industrial structure. Iron-poor Czechoslovakia remains the world's third largest per capita producer of steel, this unwanted but ideologically desirable product.

Corruption is another vital feature of the social contract, and consequently, one more pillar of the political system. This new phenomenon of truly stupendous proportions penetrates all spheres of life and reaches into high political offices. It is no longer abnormal or immoral to offer and accept bribes. *Tribuna*, the party's weekly of the most orthodox bent, even printed the prevailing tariffs: the cost of obtaining a building permit, or enrolling one's child at a university.¹³ The Prague weekly *Signal* carried a feature story about high foreign trade officials who demand bribes from the representatives of Western firms.¹⁴ However, putting aside the ethical implications of the issue, a word should be said in favor of corruption: it facilitates results which could otherwise not be achieved; it blunts the impact of injurious political demands; it makes life more liveable.

THE INSECURE RULERS AND DISSENT

Insecure rulers are intolerant rulers. Political loyalty is the prime and frequently the only qualification of a Czechoslovak officeholder. "I would not hesitate to fire even Einstein,"¹⁵ is the celebrated vow expressed by one of the officials of the Academy of Sciences in Prague, prompting the comment that whereas in the Soviet Union healthy people are locked up in lunatic asylums, in Czechoslovakia mentally disturbed individuals are put in charge of healthy institutions. In the "normalization" wave of the post-invasion period, 280,000 individuals lost their jobs for political reasons, 150,000 went into exile, thousands of scientists and 900 university professors were dismissed (after the unsuccessful revolution against the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1848, only two professors were sent into early retirement), 395 authors became non-persons, 69 movies, including internationally acclaimed and

¹³ *Tribuna*, updated, cited by *Ceske Slovo*, May, 1980, p. 9.

¹⁴ Bohumil Lippert, *Signal*, January 2, 1980. (This article achieved a certain notoriety in that it slipped by the censors, and the police failed to confiscate the entire edition.)

¹⁵ *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), cited by *Listy* (Rome), August 1973, pp. 18-19.

¹⁶ *Americke Listy*, February 29, 1980, p. 2; *Ceske Slovo*, March, 1980, p. 1.

¹⁷ Karel Kovar, *Nova Mysl*, October, 1980, p. 62.

awarded films, were banned and presumably destroyed, 21 scientific institutes were closed, several scholarly disciplines, like history, were decimated to the point of near extinction. Between 1969 and 1971, not a single literary journal was published in Bohemia and Moravia, the first such prohibition since 1821. An estimated 1 million citizens in a country of 15 million have become the "untouchables." Economic hardship (above all, prohibition of employment in one's field) is the most common punishment.

A single case may convey the intensity of the problem more aptly than any statistical account. Professor Bedrich Placak, 62, a member of the International College of Surgeons and the first Czechoslovak to perform open heart surgery, expressed "immature" political views. In consequence, he was dismissed—during an operation—and assigned to manual labor as a member of a subway construction crew. That was 10 years ago. At the moment, Professor of Surgery Placak manages to improve his lot as a guard in a museum. His letter to President Husak, published in the West,¹⁶ achieved nothing. Yet, at the same time, Husak is a vocal advocate of the policy of the "optimal utilization of manpower at our disposal"¹⁷ once labor reserves have been exhausted and the switch to intensive economic development becomes inevitable.

Despite the concern over revived Stalinist practices in the judiciary, characterized by show trials and the spontaneous confessions of the innocent, the courts have adopted a different and, thus far, unprecedented system: instead of torturing the innocent to confess their guilt, the courts do not try to obtain any evidence whatsoever. He who does not try to prove anything can never err. The sticklers for protocol may feel ill at ease, but we are dealing with Prague, the home of Franz Kafka.

Thus far the most publicized Prague trial involved a group of human rights activists, including the internationally recognized playwright Vaclav Havel. The trial held in October, 1979, led to censure by the European Parliament in Strasbourg and protests from many parts of the world. The transcript of the court proceedings (illegally obtained) shows that the verdict was reached with absolute disregard for the trial itself. In other less publicized and less scrutinized court cases, the performance of the judiciary is even more bizarre. Thus, a citizen's appeal to the valid laws of the land may be qualified as a felony of incitement or as subversive activity (Art. 98, Sect. 2b of the Penal Code). So may an appeal by the accused, arguing that the indictment violates the Final Helsinki Accord (Art. 19—freedom of expression and the right to exercise it), ratified by Czechoslovakia and promulgated as a national law (Collection of Laws No. 120 of October 13, 1976).

The felony of incitement and anti-state activity may be consummated by copying the works of celebrated

poets, or parts of the national treasure.¹⁸ Listening to the Voice of America and attempting to set up a fan club of American music do not haul the enthusiast to the execution wall; nonetheless the price is high: 15 years in prison.¹⁹

In light of these developments, the more remarkable is the success of the movement named Charter 77, after a document issued in January, 1977, in Prague and signed by several hundred Czechoslovaks—Communists and non-Communists, intellectuals as well as blue collar workers, former victims of the regime as well as former potentates, including an army general and a police colonel. Charter 77 is a unique document—an appeal to the government to obey its own laws. Milovan Djilas, the grand Yugoslav dissident, referred to Charter 77 as “the most mature and accomplished program produced by Eastern Europe from the war up to today.”²⁰

The outside observer tends to identify the “spirit of Helsinki” as the impetus behind the Charter 77 movement. Indeed, the movement was based on the solemn commitment of the Czechoslovak regime to abide by the Helsinki civil rights agreement, which became a best-seller in Czechoslovakia before its sale to the public was banned. However, this was not the only impetus. The year 1976 was also marked by the rebellion of the Polish workers and their challenge to the Communist status quo. From the very beginning, the activists of Charter 77 maintained close contacts with their Polish counterparts, including Jacek Kuron, the best-known spokesman for the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR). The Chartists adopted a strictly legalistic approach. Their behavior has not been one of petitioners for rights but of petitioners whose rights have been established in domestic law as well as in the international covenants.

In addition, a so-called second (or, parallel) culture came into existence—the samizdat publications (espe-

¹⁸Case of the accused Petr Cibulka, copying the poems of Jaroslav Seifert, the “National Artist” laureate. (*Czechoslovak Newsletter*, September 1978, pp. 2-3.)

¹⁹The culprit: Jiri Ganz, draftee in the Czechoslovak army, sentenced by the Military Tribunal in Pribram. (*Americke Listy*, November 23, 1979, p. 2.)

²⁰*The New York Times*, April 14, 1977.

²¹The International Union of Publishers awarded Ludvik Vaculik, the Czech novelist and energetic *Petice* collaborator, the title “Editor Honoris Causa” (*Der Spiegel*, July 7, 1980.)

²²*Listy*, September 1978, pp. 86-87. According to the Moscow Agreement, Soviet troops were to remain temporarily on Czechoslovak territory, explicitly to safeguard the security of the socialist countries against the intensification of revanchist efforts by militaristic forces in West Germany (Art. 1). Why then is it necessary for Soviet troops to remain in Czechoslovakia after relations between the Warsaw Pact countries and the Federal Republic of Germany have been normalized by bilateral treaties?

²³John Darton, *The New York Times*, December 11, 1980, p. 6.

cially the *Petice—Padlock* edition of literature, far superior to what is produced by the state publishing houses),²¹ the “apartment theaters,” the “flying universities”—in short, self-service of culture and education, offered mainly but not solely by the political outcasts.

By ignoring rather than challenging the establishment, the parallel culture secures for itself a certain modicum of survivability; some devotees claim that this approach is the guarantee that the non-conformists will become indestructible. However, the establishment does not hesitate to resort to various forms of harassment, including judicial persecution.

Charter 77 issues position papers on various topics like the standard of living, the destruction of the environment and the treatment of the Gypsy minority, and also on the legality of the stationing of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory. Document No. 18 provides persuasive evidence that the presence of foreign troops is contrary not only to the Czechoslovak constitution and international agreements but also the Moscow Protocol that formalized the invasion, signed by Soviet and the Czechoslovak representatives on October 16, 1968.²²

The Charter movement emphasizes that it does not provide a basis for political opposition, but it has thus far failed to generate any dialogue with the authorities. The response of the regime has been entirely negative; the movement is accused of political acts that it has never undertaken.

After three years of waiting, the party responded through its Central Committee secretary, Jan Fojtik, who rejected any dialogue with the Charter, especially in the context of Czechoslovakia’s obligation to implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.

THE POLISH CONNECTION

In 1980 in Poland, the independent trade union movement, Solidarity, received within a few months the backing of some 10 million, i.e., the absolute majority of Poland’s working force. The farmers demanded the right to form their own union and so did the students. A Solidarity chapter was even established in Interpress, the government information agency. “Solidarity buttons are worn all over town [Warsaw] and it seems that every fourth man wears a Lech Walesa [Polish labor leader] mustache.”²³

(Continued on page 181)

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"... none of Hungary's problems can be resolved merely by means of a 'confrontation' within the party leadership. The resolution to all these problems is intertwined with the relationship between Hungary and the Soviet Union. ... One should not make any mistake: Hungary remains a tightly controlled state in which the party is fully in control, a socialist state in which the dictatorship of the party is unchallenged."

The Kadar Years in Hungary

BY IVAN VOLGYES

Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska

LIKE a Roman emperor surveying his empire one last time before his death, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev arrived in Hungary on May 30, 1979. Wanting to show his prowess to the Western press and to Hungarian onlookers, he rode in an open Mercedes 600, amidst 5,000-6,000 Hungarians, many of whom were ordered out into the sweltering heat. As his motorcade drove through the city, the nearly fainting, wax-colored Brezhnev had at his side his faithful ally, Jason Kadar, the 67-year-old politician par excellence, the man who has ruled Hungary longer than any other Hungarian leader in the twentieth century. Uncomfortable in the role of receiving public adulation—even if forced—the shy, quiet Kadar, suffering from a chronic kidney problem, stood rigidly at Brezhnev's side, his face dripping under the relentless sun. The most crucial period of his leadership would culminate in the oncoming weeks and months, and Kadar must have wondered how he and his party would weather the storm.

Kadar, of course, could be proud of his public life and political activities. Once regarded as a quisling, a traitor of the revolution of 1956, he had risen to achieve at first the grudging respect, then legitimacy, and even the affection of the Hungarian population. His go-slow, step-by-step brand of politics did not involve mass arrests, mass torture and the hysterical atmosphere of terror that apparently prevailed through the East European bloc for many decades. His low profile and his unobtrusive presence made the people forget how firmly he held the reins of power. His skillful handling of the Hungarian opposition led people to blame the opposition for Kadar's decisions. And Kadar was responsible for the "economic miracle" that had occurred in Hungary after 1968.

That economic miracle, frequently referred to as the New Economic Mechanism or NEM, was born in 1968, and through many trials and tribulations and

frequent zigzags, it is still in effect today. The reform was important because it did away with much of the unnecessary central organization and direction of the economy; it introduced elements of a more rational pricing system; it allowed the market to play a role in the creation of an equilibrium between supply and demand. By forcibly consolidating agricultural units, it created large—and at least theoretically—economically efficient units, where large-scale machinery could successfully function. By nudging industrial units toward productivity and the production of marketable goods, the system was expected to eliminate factories that could not compete in the open market. By replacing central directives with international trade considerations, the Hungarian economists hoped to shift their foreign trade (heavily oriented toward trade with other Communist states) toward a far more attractive Western market. And finally, by allowing the Hungarian population to prosper, the reformers hoped to produce a consumer-oriented society, a socialist society with a bourgeois face. In short, the party tried to achieve legitimacy by giving the population economic benefits in exchange for their acquiescence in the party's rule: a depoliticized polity is never a threat to centralized political rule.

Through the ups and downs of the 1970's, the successes of the reform could be measured statistically. Outwardly, the signs of success were impressive. The three-tier pricing system introduced in 1968 showed promise as a real incentive to lower production costs and brought prices closer to their real market value. The consolidated large agricultural units, 141 collective and 1,425 state farms, raised productivity for most large-scale produced crops to above the European average; for example, compared to 1960 when 18.6 quintals per hectare of wheat and 26.1 quintals per hectare of corn were produced, by 1977 the average per hectare production had risen to 40.5 quintals of wheat and 46.4 quintals of corn.¹ Consolidations, mergers and incentive plans resulted in a move toward the elimination of unwanted and unneeded production units in industry, and the traditionally excellent (but recently neglected) electrical

¹In contrast to the 1977 figures, in 1960 there were 333 state farms and 4,507 cooperative farms. See *Statistikai Evkönyv, 1977* [Statistical Yearbook] (Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1978), pp. 231, 238. Cited hereafter as *Evkönyv*.

and light industries were being emphasized. Hungary's international trade figures shifted significantly. Although the Soviet Union remained Hungary's most important single trade partner, Hungary's trade with the West increased from 32 percent in 1965 to 49 percent in 1977.²

The Hungarian people were enjoying a standard of living far in excess of the officially reported per capita earning average of 3,000 forint per month.³ The government was allowing the operation of a second, shadow economy, which involved merciless self-exploitation, cheating, stealing, taking trips and extralegal honoraria. Hungarians were working at second, third and fourth jobs. Privatization and agricultural and tertiary sectoral activities were officially sanctioned.

Economic successes were coupled with a remarkable political stability. By allowing citizens to complain openly, the regime took the sting out of harmless malcontent. The regime also coopted its strongest critics when it allowed relatively broad freedom of artistic and literary expression. Hungarian artistic expression was categorized as supported, tolerated or prohibited; but artists nevertheless enjoyed a calm atmosphere that was only occasionally marred by debate over the categories (and never over whether there should be categorization at all). Relative freedom to travel to the West persuaded most people to behave within the mold so clearly designed to enhance desirable behavior modification.

And, finally, Kadar's staunch pro-Soviet stance was coupled with an opening toward the United States. Kadar's policy was richly rewarded when a respected American politician, Philip N. Kaiser, was posted to Budapest as United States Ambassador to Hungary, when the Crown of St. Stephen was returned and most favored nation treatment was awarded to Hungary and when the United States State Department recognized the relatively free atmosphere with regard to human rights in Hungary.

PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT

The development and the successes of the system, however, began to engender serious problems that were the direct results of the successes the regime registered in every area. Though the consolidated agricultural units provided the most efficient hard

currency earners on a large-scale for the state, they had to carry the weight of unproductive cooperatives, and they were frequently unable to compete successfully against other states producing similar goods for the restrictive European Common Market. Moreover, infrastructural improvements, like large-scale, expensive irrigation equipment and small-scale modern agricultural machinery, could not be purchased from the inadequate capital accumulation.

Since the "economic opening" to the West at the time of the downward cycle of Western economic development, Western technology was imported and the Hungarian economy had to pay increased expenses for its own development. The upward price-spiral did not make it possible to create a highly productive industrial system within a decade. Heavy industry still dominated production and the inefficient large-scale "dominant heights of industry" resulted in frequently outmoded machinery that could not be sold on the international market, except through enormous price subsidies.

As a result, price subsidies had to be continued in force, and in 1978 price subsidies had accounted for around 40 percent of the national budget. Although there were stern warnings that unprofitable enterprises would be closed and that unproductive units would be eliminated or ordered to produce salable merchandise (and not, for example, locks for unsold "guestbooks" that remained in continual production throughout the last quarter of a century), little reorganization was actually undertaken. It was hoped that the unrealistic overstocking with labor that produced overemployment would be eliminated, but the strong opposition of the trade unions, Hungary's official "anti-unemployment" Marxist ideological strictures, and opposition from other Communist states in the region prohibited experimentation in this field and resulted in shortages of labor when most firms were overstocked with unneeded labor by at least 20 percent.⁴ As an undesired but natural result of overemployment, productivity per worker remained dreadfully low, some 25-40 percent below what could have been expected. Wages reflected this, and the limited financial incentives that could be offered to the workers were not enough to overcome this problem.⁵

The foreign trade problems were also intensified. The increased price of energy drove all secondary product prices up, and Hungary had to borrow from the West to the tune of over \$1.5 billion by 1979. The increased cost of technology and material began to draw Hungary into a vicious cycle: only by keeping labor costs low—thus allowing the exploitation of Hungarian workers not only by native but also by Western capital—could the export trade stay afloat.

The second shadow economy, meanwhile, was thriving.⁶ It included all those individuals who had taken second jobs or who engaged in self-exploitation

² *Evkönyv*, 1975, pp. 259, 260; *Evkönyv*, 1977, p. 29.

³ *Evkönyv*, 1977, p. 342.

⁴ István R. Gábor, "Munkaerőhiány a mai szocialista gazdaságban" [Scarcity of Labor in Contemporary Socialist Economy], *Közgazdasági Szemle*, vol. 2 (1979), pp. 171-187.

⁵ István R. Gábor, "A második/ másodlagos/ gazdaság" [The Second or Secondary Economy], *Valóság* (1979), pp. 25-26.

⁶ In addition to the two articles listed in footnotes 4 and 5, the best studies on the subject are István R. Gábor and Péter Galasi, "Második gazdaság a mai szocializmusból"

to produce food, vegetable and animal products on household plots and in tiny auxiliary gardens. Soon, other forms, other "economies" also began to develop. A third economy in which the state or the enterprise employed individuals also engaged in private activities, using the time and the resources of the enterprise, began to take an enormous toll on productivity. A fourth economy developed—this time run by the enterprises themselves—to combat the third: by introducing "Communist Saturdays," or "solidarity weekends," using unpaid labor, they hoped to reap the profits they should have reaped from the full eight-hour work day of the workers who were "otherwise engaged."

A fifth economy developed among the workers to combat the state's latest effort; they employed another classical labor weapon—slowdowns resulting in unnecessary overtime payments and better paid weekend work.⁷ Meanwhile, the legal small-scale enterprise system also developed as a sixth economy: producing for high wages, legal small enterprises flourished in the permanent state of scarcity that characterizes every Communist economic system.

And, as if these were not enough, there developed a seventh, a "bakshish-economy," in which the tip, the gratitude money and the honoraria became not merely an accepted, but an expected factor in payment for all sorts of theoretically free services. The natural beneficiaries ranged from cabdrivers and waiters to car repair mechanics, service station attendants, doctors and lawyers, and frequently even government bureaucrats. It slowly became acceptable that for "free" medical services, like an operation, 3,000 forints or more would be paid to the doctor, for an illegally arranged telephone, 15,000, for a car outside the usual channels, 30,000 forints above the normal price.

The cost of depoliticization for political stability was also too high in many areas. That there were apathy and cynicism was expected: that the vast

[The Second Economy in Contemporary Socialism], unpublished manuscript, prepared for the Institute of Social Sciences of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' party's Central Committee, and Zoltán Zsille, "Gazdaság feketében és vörösben" [Economy in Black and Red], unpublished manuscript, Budapest, 1978. The categories used here are based on Zsille's study.

⁷Lajos Héthy and Csaba Makó, *Munkamagatartások és a gazdasági szervezet* [Labor Behavior and the Economic Organization] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972) and Lajos Héthy, "Bérvita az építkezésen" [Wage Dispute at the Construction Site], *Valóság* (1978), pp. 76-88. The disparity of wages between the state and the private sector are enormous. In 1979, a bricklayer earned 20-22 forints per hour in the state sector versus 100-150 forints or more in the private sector or in the second economy.

⁸György Bolgár, "Mi lesz?" [What Is Going to Happen?] *Elet és Irodalom*, June 16, 1979, p. 3.

⁹*Évkönyv*, 1977, p. 460.

majority of the population did not believe anything the party said was not acceptable. The party and its propaganda organs frequently had only themselves to blame. They published contrary messages: a condemnation of all terrorist activity was coupled with a praise of Palestinian terrorism, leading the readers to open cynicism. But more important, Hungarians refused to believe the party even when it seriously tried to explain the sad state of the Hungarian economy and the necessity for drastic price rises.⁸

Anti-regime political activity, to be sure, was still minimal. Those intellectuals who were discontent—like György Markus, Maria Heller, Ivan Szelenyi and a few others—were allowed to emigrate to the West; others—like György Konrad—were allowed to travel for extended stays to the West and to return at the whim of the leadership. Local political critics, such as the group of sociologists and writers who were loosely identified with the illegal *samizdat* publication, *Profil*, were slowly eased out of their jobs, and given only minimal opportunities to work and write in their chosen professions. Although they were occasionally denounced in party *aktivus* meetings, occasionally harassed and questioned, police terror was rarely used against them and the regime made no martyrs. In fact, the decision makers frequently agreed with the critics, but the critics were able to utter such heretic statements far more easily than the decision makers, who had to account for their public utterances. At the same time, political opponents of the regime who were sentenced for "inciting" rather than for political activities per se, in short, people who (usually over a couple of beers) expressed derogatory and condemnatory criticisms of communism and the Soviet Union, received short shrift: for example, in 1977 prison sentences of 1 to 2 years were meted out to 133 such "inciters"—mostly uneducated workers and peasants.⁹ Nonetheless, practically no individual was arrested in Hungary in the 1970's for political activity.

The intellectual and political climate has also been clouded by the fact that the list of topics that could not be discussed openly seemed to grow during the decade. Soviet-Hungarian historic ties remained a taboo, unless they were discussed in the most orthodox perspective. Thus, for example, György Borsányi's volume on Béla Kun and the 1920's, though edited and supervised (among others) by Hungary's staunchest conservative Politburo member, Dezső Nemes, was withdrawn from publication immediately after it appeared. It was withdrawn because it discussed too many aspects of the activities of the GRU, the military intelligence unit in the Soviet Union, and its connections with the international Communist movement.

In domestic politics, the party's attempts to re-politicize the polity were unsuccessful. The much vaunted local or direct democracy that the regime

attempted to incorporate into its political life backfired. Some Hungarians took the question of democracy too seriously, like Zoltan Szep, the blind representative from Budapest's third district, who continued to ask provocative questions to which no answer could be given in Parliament and then who thus was forcibly evicted from the parliamentary session. Or, the apparatchiks regarded democracy as only the continuation of "democracy" as they knew it and allowed no input from a sullen population, who they theoretically wanted to politicize.¹⁰

In foreign policy, Kadar had little room to maneuver. It is always easiest for a small state to offer loyalty to buy domestic maneuverability from a dominant state, a fact that was explained in pleasant and honest terms to the United States congressional delegation that visited Hungary in 1978. Nonetheless, Kadar represented a national sentiment when he tried unofficially to encourage Romania to improve its treatment of the badly oppressed Hungarian minority in Transylvania, although some well-meaning liberals in the West and some not-so-well-meaning nationalists everywhere charged that he was "doing the bidding of Moscow." Still, Kadar was far from expressing the sentiment of the people, for whom the question of Hungarian minorities in the neighboring state (but notably in Transylvania where their situation is the worst) is paramount. Kadar's forays into a cautious support of Eurocommunism stemmed from the "European approach" of his own brand of politics and from his own West European "respectability" as an elder statesman in the East; these forays were generally unsuccessful, because Eurocommunism itself began to be on the wane in the West. The most difficult period for the Hungarian leadership began to develop in 1978 and took on the full force of a quiet but serious crisis in 1979.

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

Surveying the economic situation facing the Hungarian population, a well-regarded economist recently repeated the old adage: "The situation is hopeless, but not bad." On the face of it, such pessimism seems to be unwarranted, since the markets of Budapest are full of all kinds of consumer goods. In spite of the fact that socialist economies seem to perpetuate consumer goods scarcity, in Hungary (in marked contrast to neighboring socialist states) practically anyone can buy any food products desired; everything from meat to fruit and vegetables seems to be in abundance. The

¹⁰Mária Ludassy, "Bizottságosdi" [Playing Committees], *Elet és Irodalom*, June 9, 1979, p. 9.

¹¹Julia Venyige [Mrs. Molnár], "Munkamegosztás és érdekvizsgonyok" [The Division of Labor and Interest Relations], *Közgazdasági Szemle*, vol. 5 (1979), pp. 539-547.

¹²Pál Romány, "Mezőgazdaságunk a 70-es évek végén" [Our Agriculture at the End of the 70s], *Közgazdasági Szemle*, vol. 5 (1979), pp. 513-528.

problem of costs, however, clouds the picture. As price supports from agricultural goods were slowly removed or sharply reduced, the price of the supported items began to increase; meat and vegetable prices have nearly doubled in the last two years. Due to inclement weather, relatively low supplies and high demand, the free prices in fruits and vegetables have climbed higher and higher and no end seems to be in sight. As the small-scale producers, whose production accounts for at least 40 percent of marketed agricultural consumer products, explain it, the prices must reflect their own hard work: if prices do not reflect the work, they will simply refuse to produce it.¹¹ And if there is no food, the cities will suffer and riots will become inevitable, and that the Hungarian leadership can ill afford.

In industrial production, after more than eight years of non-decision, the party seems finally to be bent on implementing the much needed and hitherto merely talked-about phase of the reform, called euphemistically "restructuring." This phrase indicates that those enterprises that cannot show profits under real market conditions will be closed and that other factories or other production lines that can show profits will take over unproductive firms. Managers of enterprises are to receive a nearly free hand, allocating higher wages to those who work well, and firing those whose labor is not productive. Unemployment will undoubtedly occur, but it is expected to be a temporary phenomenon, because workers will be relocated to areas where their skills can best be utilized. If one believes the statements of nearly all Politburo members, from Gyorgy Aczel to Karoly Nemeth, the process will be forcefully implemented. In fact, Ede Horvath, the practical czar-manager of the huge Raba complex in Györ, fired 1,500 workers in February, 1980.

Opposition to the introduction of necessary unemployment comes not only from many old-time managers who are unable to live with a mechanism that requires flexibility and skill, but also from the interest groups that developed over the last decade. Although economic development also means increased interest group activity, the polity has not been able to deal adequately with the complexity of multiple authorities. In addition to the interests of the trade union and its bureaucracy (an interest group articulation that incidentally goes far beyond the Leninist concept of the trade union as a transmission belt of the party), only the minister identifies with the national interests in most ministries.¹² All those working for him or for other bureaucracies have local, sectoral or personal interests that apparently overshadow national goals. Just like the earlier phase of reform, if the party intends to implement this phase, it must deal with its own bureaucracies from a centralist perspective.

In foreign trade, problems are also intensifying. Hungarian bankers were able to raise another \$300 million in the United States and in Switzerland in 1979, and a large number of Kuwaiti millionaire oil sheiks were attracted by the favorable deposit rates given by the Hungarian National Bank. Still, the export-import imbalance is expected to have a crippling effect on Hungarian foreign trade. Because of low productivity, the end of price supports for many export items would mean that these products could not compete successfully against similar products on the world market, and extending price supports would not be efficacious. Decreasing the import of Western technology, says József Bognár, one of Hungary's most highly respected economists, would mean lowering the growth dynamism of the economy, which Hungary currently cannot afford.¹³

In fact, increasing trade with the United States is not the answer either; thus the benefits of most favored nation (MFN) status will not yield the expected results for Hungary. Not only are Hungarian salesmen generally inadequate in their ability to sell Hungarian products in the United States market, but only specialized products can be purchased by America's huge economy. "Yes, it would help somewhat," says Lajos Lada, section chief of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, "if the health regulations were implemented to allow the importation of raw meat products to the United States," but that, too, "would be somewhat small potatoes."¹⁴ The negotiations over the extension of Export-Import Bank credits to Hungary are proceeding slowly, and meanwhile the practical monopoly of the West German Republic (FRG), Hungary's largest single Western trading partner, is growing by leaps and bounds.

POLITICAL STABILITY'S PRICE

The well-being of the country, the good life and the laissez faire attitude about economic activity were the price for political stability. The projected elimination of price supports from most domestic consumer and marketed products, the planned equilibrium between Western and Hungarian real prices, and the projected equalization of commercial and tourist foreign currency rates will mean a sharply reduced Hungarian living standard. The rising costs of apartments and housing in general exacerbated the already inadequate housing conditions of nearly 10 percent of the Hungarian

¹³József Bognár, "A gazdasági haladás lehetséges utjai" [The Possible Road of Economic Development], *Valóság*, vol. 1 (1979), p. 15.

¹⁴Interview with the author, May 8, 1979.

¹⁵In 1977, 59.4 percent of all housing units were built by private effort and not through state or cooperative construction firms. *Evkönyv*, 1977, p. 379.

¹⁶Elemer Hankiss, "Felemás világ" [Semi-developed World], *Valóság*, vol. 6 (1977), pp. 28-44.

population and have made Hungary's housing problem the worst in the Soviet bloc.¹⁵ Because of the rise of the price of oil imported to Hungary from the Soviet Union and the West, gasoline prices have doubled in a couple of years, taking larger and larger chunks of disposable income; and with the expected almost 30 percent rise in the price of cars (and the increasing difficulties in obtaining and selling a car), the automobile is becoming a luxury once again. Although the second and other economies will probably keep up with the rise in prices, as price rises in the legal economy are passed on to the consumers in the second economy an increasingly large number of people, unable to share in this second economy, will suffer a real decline in their living standards. Says D.S., an official of one of Hungary's many book publishing firms:

For a car-mechanic or a doctor it is easy: He just charges more for his services. But the measly raise of the expected 160 forints that I am getting hardly covers the cost of my increasing electric bill, much less the increased cost of meat.

So far, the regime has managed to minimize public discontent. Quips one prominent journalist with close ties to the Politburo:

The reason for the minimal discontent is simple. [The regime] spreads the word of price rises amounting to 50 percent. Naturally, the word gets around that a 100 percent price-rise is planned. And when a price-rise of merely twenty-five percent shows up everybody is—if not ecstatic—at least content that the price was raised minimally.

With the decrease in the standard of living that has been the sole support of the party's legitimacy, the regime will face severe problems during the next lean years. Hungary's leaders must continue with the reform, unless they return to Stalinist methods of administration; but if they continue with the reform they will face unrest and social tension the like of which has not flourished in Hungary since the 1950's. In a society that has developed very successfully in economic terms since those days, social development has not been nearly so positive. Hungary is clearly a semi-developed society, as far as social life and norms are concerned, according to Elemer Hankiss of the Institute of Literary Science.¹⁶ Hungary is a society in constant stress, in which transactions take place without civility and without human warmth. It is a society in which "socialist" norms and mores have not yet replaced all the stratified mores of the previous hierarchy.

(Continued on page 183)

Ivan Volgyes is the author and editor of seven books and more than a score of articles dealing with East Europe and the U.S.S.R. His most recent book is *Political Socialization in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

"As in most nations of Europe, the last few years brought serious economic difficulties to Bulgaria. Although production seemed to make modest advances, goals were not attained, real income dropped, Western trade in the amount sought did not materialize, and shortages of food supplies and other items were severe."

Bulgaria: The Solace of History

BY FREDERICK B. CHARY

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FOR the past several years, Bulgaria has been trying to expand its trade and cultural contacts with the West while remaining Moscow's most unswervingly loyal ally in political matters and foreign affairs. After some doubts early in the 1970's, Sofia embraced the spirit of détente with unbridled enthusiasm in mid-decade. Now, after five years of historical commemorations celebrating the centennial of Bulgaria's liberation from Turkey (and culminating next spring with the celebration of the 1300th anniversary of the founding of the first Bulgarian Empire), the threats to détente that have arisen since the crises in Iran, Afghanistan and Poland have left the country with a feeling of anxiety bordering on despair.

Cultural links with the West, particularly with the United States, have increased at a remarkable rate, even though trade goals have fallen far short of their targets. Sofia may have succeeded in raising interest in Bulgaria among the American academic community and surely captured the fancy of the art world with the Thracian gold exhibit in 1978. Nonetheless, for most Americans, Bulgaria is one of the least known of the East European nations, and it projects a generally negative image because of its closeness to the Soviet Union. During the last few years, there have been a few changes in leadership, but the position of Todor Zhivkov remains secure. Economically the country suffered the reverses prevalent throughout the region after 1975. Yet all in all, the single issue that has preoccupied Bulgaria for the last two years is an old one—Macedonia.

The eleventh congress of the Bulgarian Communist party in 1976 brought significant changes in the top leadership, as Todor Pavlov, Ivan Popov, and Zhivko Zhivkov, three perennial fixtures, were removed from the Politburo. In all probability they stepped down because of age; the Politburo probably wanted to bring new blood into the leadership, thus establishing a more efficient relationship between party and government. Pavlov, an academician and former regent, Popov, a respected trade expert well-known and received in the West, and Zhivkov, another elder states-

man not related to the First Secretary, remained as full members of the Central Committee.¹ Eighteen months later, in December, 1977, Ognian Doinov, Central Committee Secretary, General Dobri Dzhurov, minister of national defense, and Peter Mladenov, foreign minister, were elected to the Central Committee.² In the meantime, in May, 1977, senior member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee Boris Velchev was suddenly dismissed from all posts without explanation. Western speculation hinted at a power struggle.

In any case, First Secretary Zhivkov remains firmly in command and his daughter, Liudmila Zhivkova, chairman of the State Commission on Culture and a professional historian specializing in English-Bulgarian relations, remains one of the chief proponents for improving relations with the West. In a surprise move in the summer of 1979, she along with two others, Peko Takev and Todor Bozhinov, were added to the Politburo. Other major political changes resulted from disappointments in the field of agriculture.

As in most nations of East Europe, the last few years brought serious economic difficulties to Bulgaria. Although production seemed to make modest advances, goals were not attained, real income dropped, Western trade in the amount sought did not materialize, and shortages of food supplies and other items were severe. Part of this undoubtedly was due to the too rapid expansion of consumer goods production in the late 1960's and the early 1970's, creating a serious problem of under capitalization. In part the problem was caused by the worldwide energy shortage and accompanying economic difficulties.

For Bulgaria, just at the time of rising expectations there was a cutback in material progress. The joke in Sofia last year told of guests arriving at a friend's apartment. "Do you want a cup of coffee," the host asked, "or should I just deposit the money in your bank account?" With coffee at \$14.00 a pound when it is obtainable, there was indeed truth behind the wit. In 1979, Bulgaria also set the world record price for gasoline—1 lev for 1 liter, or \$4.25 a gallon.

As a consequence of agricultural difficulties, there was a general shakeup in the ministry of agriculture and food industries. In the spring of 1978, Sava

¹Rabotnicheskoe Delo, April 3, 1976; The New York Times, April 3, 1976.

²Sofia News, December 21, 1977.

Dubulkov, Deputy Premier in charge of food supply and reserves, Mako Dakov, another Deputy Premier, and Gacho Kruse, minister of agriculture, and some others were dismissed, and Deputy Premier Grigor Stoichkov was appointed minister of agriculture.

Bulgaria's economic difficulties have resulted in a great deal of bitterness including some unprecedented political action. Although the exact facts are hard to pin down, rumors of unauthorized demonstrations and even a sit-down strike at the large Kremikovtsi Steel Works outside Sofia circulated in June, 1978. From a Vienna source, *The New York Times* reported the formation of a dissident group demanding, among other things, independent trade unions. If this latter action really occurred two years before the Polish strikes, it raises the question whether there will be any overflow from Poland to Bulgaria. It is unlikely that Bulgarian workers will imitate their Polish counterparts unless the independent trade union movement spreads through the entire Eastern bloc. Official reaction to the Polish crisis has been exceptionally muted, and when it appears it is simply a restating of the Soviet position. Bulgarian intellectuals find it hard to believe that the Poles have been able to go as far as they have, and they hope that the crisis will not lead to a resumption of the cold war and ruin the gains in Western contacts that Bulgaria has already made.

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

Throughout the 1970's, Sofia has been interested in expanding trade with the West and Japan, and the tourist industry has become a major part of the Bulgarian economy. In 1978, almost 5 million foreigners visited the country. Joint ventures in hotels and restaurants have been undertaken by Balkantourist (the state tourist agency) and Sweden, France, Japan, and so on, and Western firms have contracted with Bulgarian economic agencies and enterprises for the transfer of technology and the loan of specialists.

At the same time, there has been a major increase in the number of cultural exchanges and scholarly meetings with Westerners. In June, 1978, American scholars met with their Bulgarian counterparts at Druzhba near Varna for a week-long scholarly conference. At that time, it was announced that Professor Irwin Sanders of Boston University would be inducted into the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences as a foreign corresponding member. Both Americans and Bulgarians applauded the conference and looked forward to a sequel to be held in the United States in Boston in 1982.

Bulgarian and Western scholars have collaborated on joint publications, translations and other projects. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences has financed the expenses of Western scholars who have participated in many conferences in Bulgaria over the past few years. The most recent series comprises four meetings cele-

brating the 1300th anniversary of the birth of medieval Bulgaria. Three preliminary conferences embracing all disciplines have been held over the past two years. The culmination will be a grand conference bringing together hundreds of Bulgarian specialists across the world next April in Sofia. Bulgarian scholars have been accepting visiting appointments and fellowships in the West in ever-increasing numbers—bringing their spouses and children. Even ordinary Bulgarian citizens have been participating in tours of non-socialist cities such as Athens, Vienna, and Paris in a partial relaxation of travel bans.

Bulgaria's bad image in the West, however, continued; in a decade of general malign media neglect, the most attention the country received beyond the small circle of specialists who follow it involved the curious affair of Georgi Markov. Markov, a respected poet and dramatist, fled from Bulgaria in 1969; after that time until his death he had been working as a commentator for the British Broadcasting Company, analyzing events in his native country and severely and accurately criticizing the leadership. In September, 1978, he died from blood poisoning. Soon it was revealed that shortly before his fatal illness he was scratched with an umbrella tip by an unknown man in a crowded London street.

The case reminded another Bulgarian defector, Vladimir Kostov, of an incident involving himself in the Paris Metro. Kostov had been shot by an airgun loaded with minute poison pellets, and he became seriously ill. Kostov recovered; but the same type of pellets were found in the body of Markov. Shortly thereafter another Bulgarian defector was found dead in his home under mysterious circumstances. The cloak-and-dagger nature of these events caused a great deal of curiosity in the West, where, although nothing was proved, it was assumed that the Bulgarian security police were behind the assassinations and attempted assassinations.

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION

The issue that has most engaged Bulgarian attention over the past two years is the recurring Macedonian question and Bulgaria's consequent relations with Yugoslavia. The public acrimony between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia has been intense since World War II. Most Americans, if they know anything at all about Yugoslav national problems, think chiefly of Croatians and Serbs, and maps of Yugoslavia in the mass media still refer to Macedonia as South Serbia. When the Macedonian question is mentioned in the Western press at all, it is usually assumed that Sofia is raising the question at the behest of Moscow to jab at Belgrade; thus Western sympathy is usually reserved for the Yugoslavs. In reality, the issues of Macedonian nationality are so obscure as to be almost impossible to untangle.

Both sides agree that there is a Macedonian nation which, based on language, is a member of the South Slav group; hence Macedonians are related to the Bulgarians, Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes. The academic question is when this Macedonian nation first appeared. Scholars from Sofia say it appeared in 1945; those from Skopje and Belgrade believe a Macedonian people has existed at least from the time of the origin of the South Slavs. The political questions concern territorial rights. Does Sofia have claims over Vardar Macedonia, i.e., the Yugoslav Macedonian republic? Or, from the other side: Can Belgrade claim an interest in the land or population of the Pirin region, i.e., Bulgarian Macedonia?

Macedonia was indeed only a geographical expression in 1870, when Sultan Abdul Aziz granted a *firman* creating a Bulgarian exarchate; paving the way for religious independence from the Greek patriarch of Constantinople. The South Slav population of Macedonia became the target for rival schools built by the Greek patriarchate (which never recognized the Bulgarian church), the Serbian patriarchate, and the exarchate. National consciousness became a function of religion and education. There are at least two complicating factors that are only incidental to the current difficulties between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. First, historically Macedonia was a land not only of South Slavs but of all sorts of nationalities—Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Gypsies, Romanian-speaking Vlachs, Jews. (Thessaloniki, the capital of geographic Macedonia, was one of the major Jewish centers of Europe before World War II.)

In this context, the questions "Who are the Macedonians?" and "What political state should represent them?" are even more difficult to answer. The exchange of populations among Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria after World War I, the Jewish holocaust, and the employment of political nationalism by Sofia, Belgrade and Athens after World War II reduced some of the complexity but none of the emotion.

Second, the Greeks have defiantly refused to recognize Orthodox Christian Macedonians as anything but Greeks, with the exception of a relatively few Serbs. For Athens, church and cultural affiliation rather than language is the key to nationality in Macedonia; and since the exarchate in their view was illegal, Slavophones (i.e., members of the Greek church who speak a Slavic tongue) belonged to the Greek patriarchate in 1870 and their descendants are now members of the Greek nation. Since the Balkan Wars, those who have lived under Greek rule have been under great pressure to accept their Greek nationality.

The Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, created a large Bulgaria including most of Macedonia, but its provisions never took effect. The Treaty of Berlin, signed by all major

powers of Europe a few months afterward, redivided Bulgaria into three parts, leaving Macedonia under Turkish control. Nevertheless, San Stefano Bulgaria has remained a Bulgarian national dream. Even those Bulgarians who were willing to give up the eventual acquisition of Macedonia in the interest of peace with their neighbors generally believed that in truth Bulgarian claims to the territory were the best documented.

But there were those who were not willing to give up the claims. Bulgarian political and terrorist associations, particularly the infamous Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), organized to liberate Macedonia from the Turks and win its annexation to Bulgaria. The Greeks and Serbs formed rival political and paramilitary groups, and national consciousness became a function of the clash of arms. IMRO adopted Gladstone's statement, "Macedonia for the Macedonians," as its motto, and some of its members proposed the establishment of a separate Macedonian state (while recognizing its Bulgarian nationality) to get around the great power objection to an oversized Bulgaria.

In 1912-1913, Macedonia was at last "liberated" from the Turks by the joint efforts of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro in the First Balkan War. However, the great powers intervened, and the prewar division scheme fell through. Locked out of most of Macedonia by Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria rashly started the Second Balkan War. It lost. Then Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in World War I in another attempt to acquire what all Bulgarians thought was rightfully theirs. A second failure resulted. After the war, Bulgaria retained only a minor portion of Macedonia (the Pirin); the remaining territory, the lion's share, was divided between Greece and the newly created kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—Yugoslavia.

Both these countries instituted policies of forced assimilation. Athens, in addition, transferred tens of thousands of Greeks from Turkey into Macedonia thus reducing the percentage of Slavs there. (Many Macedonian Slavs were also transferred to Bulgaria.) IMRO continued to fight for a Bulgarian Macedonia, principally against Yugoslavia. An IMRO agent working with Croatian terrorists assassinated King Alexander in Marseilles in 1934. Factions within the organization were also responsible for much internecine warfare, and the group fell into disrepute. It was most probably during this time that a separate Macedonian national consciousness began to appear.

World War II brought another brief Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia and a third defeat and loss. After World War II, national consciousness became a function of government policy. Unlike the Yugoslav monarchy, the new Socialist Federation of Yugoslav Republics did not insist that the Macedonian Slavs

were Serbs. They were Macedonians, distinct in nationality from both the Serbs and the Bulgarians. Bulgaria, however, was a people's democracy, and the leaders of Bulgaria had been wartime allies of the leaders of Yugoslavia—an alliance that was supposed to continue into the postwar period. A peaceful solution to the Macedonian question seemed possible between socialist allies.

Even after the break between Yugoslavia and the Cominform in 1948, the Bulgarians recorded people of Macedonian nationality. The census of 1956 showed that of 281,015 people in the Pirin region, 178,862 (64 percent) listed their nationality as Macedonian, and 93,671 (33 percent) listed their nationality as Bulgarian.³ However, censuses of nationality in Macedonia are very much open to question. The Greeks list hardly any Slavs among the nationalities of their Macedonian (geographic) population, and the Yugoslavs claim that none of the South Slavs in their Macedonian republic are Bulgarian. Census manipulation in Macedonian politics is not new, and statistics are not satisfactory as a key to the nationality question.

If shared cultural characteristics and feelings of national consciousness are reasonable attributes of nationalism, then undoubtedly there are Macedonians in the Pirin and Bulgarians in the Vardar, but their numbers cannot even be estimated. Since 1945, the Yugoslavs have been developing the concept of Macedonian nationhood. Today, the Macedonian language is indeed a distinct South Slav language, even if only by the definition that "a language is a dialect with an army." Macedonians have a folklore and history defined and researched by Macedonian scholars. The fact that Bulgarians share that history and folklore is not unusual. After all, both the Russians and the Ukrainians claim medieval Kiev as their ancient homeland.

Two other points may clarify the events of the past two years with regard to Macedonia. First, there is the fate of IMRO. The major (Bulgarian) faction was in complete disgrace after World War II because of its association with the fascists. There was no possibility that it could reestablish operations in the Balkans; but it continues to exist under the name of the Macedonian Political Organization (MPO), based in the United States and Canada. The MPO's view is simply that there is no Macedonian nationality; Macedonian (geographic) South Slavs are Bulgarians. Second, in the political game between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia, Yugoslavia holds most of the trumps. It possesses the largest section of Macedonia, and has Western sympathy on its side. (Bulgaria, it is true, has Soviet patronage, but that is not always an advantage.) Yugoslavia also enjoys a more prosperous

economy and a more liberal society than Bulgaria. These last factors have meant that the incentives for Pirin Bulgarians to classify themselves as Macedonians are greater than the incentives for Vardar Macedonians to classify themselves Bulgarians. (A public declaration of the wrong nationality in either area or in Greek Macedonia—this is not necessarily a "Communist" problem—is extremely risky, perhaps foolhardy.) Lacking Yugoslavia's political and economic advantages, the Bulgarians have retreated to the solace of history. The issue has remained in contention between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for the last 30 years and in some cases has even divided families.

BILATERAL TALKS FAIL

The present crisis began with the failure of bilateral talks that began in 1975. At that time, Tito and Zhivkov agreed to work out their problems. A joint working group consisting of delegates from both countries was organized and met in Sofia and Belgrade in 1976 to prepare for a summit meeting of the two leaders. In April, 1977, the Yugoslav delegation to the Joint Working Committee announced that it would not continue the preparations unless Bulgaria acknowledged the rights of its Macedonian minority. This position was approved by the eleventh congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists meeting in June, 1978. The Macedonian question once more broke out in full force in the Bulgarian and Yugoslav press.

On June 15, 1978, while the Yugoslav party was meeting, Zhivkov made a key speech at Blagoevgrad, the capital of Bulgarian Macedonia, a city named after the founder of the Bulgarian Communist party, who was born in Macedonia. Zhivkov proposed a "mutual observance of the realities of the two sides of the frontier," the right of each population to determine its nationality, and the mutual renunciation of territorial claims. In other words, Macedonians

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³From *Recognition to Repudiation: Bulgarian Attitudes on the Macedonian Question* (Skopje: kultura, 1972), p. 20.

“Ceausescu’s Romania continues its search for legitimacy. . . . Given Romania’s economic difficulties and the regime’s inability to cope with them, additional, primarily material, incentives for normative commitment are increasingly crucial, but they are correspondingly difficult to formulate.”

Romania: Neo-Stalinism in Search of Legitimacy

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EVERY government, regardless of its institutional structure or ideological orientation, seeks to justify its exercise of political power. Marxist-Leninist governments, like that of the Socialist Republic of Romania, are no different, although the dissonances between their theoretical and actual methods of acquiring and maintaining political legitimacy are particularly evident. In theory, Communist party-states should enjoy popular support because they are dialectically inevitable, because they are inherently democratic, and because their socialist organization of production delivers an abundance of goods. In practice, however, Communist governments’ methods of legitimization are distinctly un-Marxist: coercion, nationalism and, more recently, consumerism.¹ Marxism-Leninism, unable to redeem its promises, is increasingly irrelevant except as an excuse for authoritarianism and as a source of prescriptive goals.

It is in this light that the conventional evocation of the apparent paradox between Romania’s assertively distinct, if not altogether independent, foreign policy and its brutally Stalinist domestic policy must be

¹For an informative essay on legitimacy in advanced socialist societies see chapter one of David Lane’s *The Socialist Industrial State: Towards a Political Sociology of State Socialism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976). For legitimacy in Ceaușescu’s Romania see Mary Ellen Fischer, “Participatory Reforms and Political Development in Romania” in Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Cocks, eds., *Political Development in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 217-237.

²E.g., Robert L. Farlow, “Romania: The Politics of Autonomy,” *Current History*, April, 1978, pp. 168-171, 185-186.

³For the skeptics see George Cioranescu et. al., *Aspects des relations soviéto-roumaines 1967-1971: sécurité européenne* (Paris: Minard, 1971), and Vladimir Socor, “The Limits of National Independence in the Soviet Bloc: Rumania’s Foreign Policy Reconsidered,” *Orbis*, Fall, 1976, pp. 701-732. For the conventional view see Aurel Braun, *Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: the Political and Military Limits of Autonomy* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978) and Ronald H. Linden, *Bear and Foxes: The International Relations of the East European States, 1965-1969* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Quarterly, 1970).

⁴For an excellent treatment of the system see Trond Gilberg, *Modernization in Romania Since World War Two* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

examined.² Despite expressions of doubt by emigré analysts, the evidence supports the contention that since the early 1960’s Romania has pursued a measurably autonomous foreign policy relative to the policies of the other subordinate members of the Warsaw Pact (WTO) and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).³ At the same time, it is evident that Nicolae Ceaușescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist party (RCP) and President of the Republic, presides over a repressive authoritarian regime replete with the paraphernalia of a ludicrous personality cult and an omnipresent secret police. The paradox is superficial. Deviant foreign policy and domestic totalitarianism are inextricably linked in an intricate system of carefully calculated and adeptly executed political trade-offs, which fulfills the doctrinally prescribed goal of rapid economic development, elicits popular support and maintains national sovereignty.⁴ The key components of the system are: rapid and extensive industrialization; the highly centralized and personalized exercise of political power; ideological mobilization and intensive political socialization; nationalism; and repression.

Both Western and Romanian analysts recognize the linkage between Romania’s goal of multilateral economic development and its maverick foreign policy. Emerging from the economic and political dislocations of World War II and the subsequent Soviet plundering of its considerable natural wealth, Romania embarked on an ambitious program of economic diversification and growth. With Soviet approval, if not insistence, the RCP, led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej until his death in 1965 and thereafter by Nicolae Ceaușescu, adopted the Stalinist model for rapid economic development, which had proved so “successful” in the similarly backward U.S.S.R. in the 1930’s. Despite Soviet and Soviet bloc de-Stalinization after 1956, Romania has retained its Stalinist strategy, the primary economic components of which are high (as much as one-third of national income) rates of investment; the establishment of a broad industrial base capable of providing both producer and, more recently, consumer goods; the development of domestic natural resources; the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture; the expansion of volume

and make-up of foreign trade and diversification of suppliers of imports and markets for exports; and the development of human resources.

The implementation of the Romanian strategy resulted in one of Europe's highest growth rates, averaging an 8.6 percent annual increase in national income over the quarter century, 1950-1975.⁵ Romania has been transformed from a predominantly agrarian to an industrial society, now poised to join the ranks of the "developed countries," a goal set for accomplishment by 1990.

The political and economic exigencies of this radical transformation of Romanian society, the RCP's foremost priority, in large part explain the origins of Romania's autonomous foreign policy. The imposition of Stalinist model economies in the postwar East European states created vertically integrated economic nationalisms that did not easily lend themselves to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's integrationist designs of the late 1950's and early 1960's. While the supranational planning of a socialist division of labor did not threaten more diversified bloc economies, like those of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, it would have perpetuated less developed Romania's status as the bloc's "breadbasket and gas station." Such a relegation was clearly at odds with the RCP's strategy of multilateral development. Taking advantage of the favorable international conditions occasioned by the Soviet preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet dispute, Romania rejected Khrushchev's proposal of transforming the CMEA into a supranational planning agency.

Despite the realization that the RCP's adherence to a quasi-autarchic strategy of development would require Draconian sacrifices on the part of the Romanian population, the regime accurately calculated that the reassertion of national independence, especially at the expense of the despised Russians, would elicit popular support. The short-run trade-off was acceptance of material hardships in exchange for the reassertion of national autonomy. In the long run, as the party ceaselessly reminded the masses, sacrifices were an investment in future prosperity.

⁵For a descriptive study of the strategy and its results see Andreas C. Tsantis and Roy Pepper, *Romania, the Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy under Socialist Planning* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1979). For an earlier analytical assessment see John Michael Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967).

"See Ronald H. Linden, "Romanian Foreign Policy in the 1980s," in Daniel N. Nelson and Stephen Fischer-Galati, eds., *Romania in the 1980's* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); David Floyd, *Rumania, Russia's Dissident Ally* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965); and, Horia Socianu, "The Foreign Policy of Romania in the Sixties," in James A. Kuhlman, ed., *The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Determinants* (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1978), pp. 167-189.

In order to accomplish its internal and external objectives, Romania's deviant foreign policy had to be implemented with diplomatic finesse and Byzantine acumen. Not only did the regime have to convince the Romanian population of Romania's genuine independence, which meant eliciting at least minimal adverse Soviet reaction, but it also required a precise calculation of the limits of Soviet tolerance. In addition, it would have to be convincing enough to attract Western support in the form of trade and economic assistance without completely alienating Romania's trading partners within the bloc. Both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu proved to be astute diplomats and perspicacious analysts of Soviet intentions.

During the 1960's, instances of Romanian defiance of Soviet-prescribed policy norms followed one another with dizzying rapidity. Not only did Romania remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, it also subverted Soviet attempts to obtain international Communist condemnation of the Chinese. Romania precipitously and positively responded to West Germany's "ostpolitik," establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn in 1967. Trade with the West increased dramatically, with the Germans as Romania's foremost Western partners. Romania maintained neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and refused to break off diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six Day War. Alone among the bloc governments, Romania refused to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Romania gradually reduced its participation in WTO and CMEA activities, roundly condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and explicitly rejected the Brezhnev Doctrine justifying Soviet intervention. In 1969, Romania became the first Soviet bloc country to welcome a postwar American President.⁶

In the 1970's cordial, if symbolic, relations with China culminated in an exchange of state visits by Ceausescu and China's Communist party chairman Hua Guofeng in 1978. Political, economic and military cooperation with Yugoslavia intensified. Despite increasingly stringent Western credit restrictions caused by its large hard currency debt, Romania continued diversified economic and political relations with the West. It has significantly expanded its international interactions with the third world since President Ceausescu's definition of Romania as "a socialist developing state" in the early 1970's. Romania has joined the "Group of 77," gained observer status at the Nonaligned Conference, vigorously supported the concept of a "new international economic order," and called for a United Nations charter reform to enhance the General Assembly's authority. The developing countries provide markets for Romanian manufactured goods and desperately needed raw materials for Romanian industry. Romania demonstrated more willingness to participate in CMEA

institutions and to coordinate economic plans during the 1970's. The rapid decline in the proportion of Romania's foreign trade with the other CMEA countries was halted. The Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war cut off two important sources of imported oil and Romania replaced its shortfall with Soviet oil in 1979 and 1980.

Romanian-Soviet relations, while appearing to be normalized, are still subject to periodic setbacks. After the November, 1978, Moscow convocation of the WTO Political Consultative Committee, for example, President Ceaușescu appealed to the Romanian people to support his rejection of a Soviet demand that bloc military budgets be substantially increased. Ceaușescu's appeals to key Romanian elites, heavily laced with patriotic rhetoric, were probably unnecessary had their sole objective been to convince the Soviets of Romanian intransigence. However, as one Western analyst suggested earlier, Ceaușescu's leadership was experiencing severe pressures.⁷ What better way to bolster his authority than a new round of most Romanians' favorite pastime—taunting the bear? Ceaușescu's risk was correctly calculated to be minimal. True to form, the Soviets and their loyalist allies responded angrily, but only symbolically and rhetorically,⁸ while Ceaușescu received renewed popular and international support.

Bucharest's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been far more circumspect but nonetheless disapproving. Although Romania did not participate in the United Nations General Assembly vote condemning the invasion, Ceaușescu's early 1980 speeches were filled with esoteric references to favorite foreign policy themes like noninterference, independence and national sovereignty. The RCP declined the Polish and French parties' invitation to the Paris conference designed to demonstrate international Communist solidarity with the Soviet position. In November, 1980, interviews with Scandinavian newspapers, Ceaușescu called for a negotiated settlement, multilateral pledges of noninterference, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. But the Romanian media has been largely silent on events in Afghanistan, and no official spokesman has directly attacked the Soviet action. While Romania could not help but disapprove

⁷Patrick Moore, "Romania: A Crisis of Leadership?" Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report/212 (Romania), September 27, 1978.

⁸Bloc countries reportedly recalled their ambassadors from Bucharest. *Washington Star*, November 29, 1978. The Soviet media was explicitly critical; e.g., *Pravda*, December 16, 1978.

⁹For overall summaries see Marvin R. Jackson, "Perspectives on Romania's Economic Development in the 1980s," in Daniel N. Nelson and Stephen Fischer-Galati, *op. cit.*

¹⁰George Wassilko, "Plan for 1981 Approved; 1981-1985 Plan Delayed," Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report/288 (Romania), December 2, 1980.

of the invasion in principle, the leadership has perceived the situation as too remote and too sensitive to risk a more vigorous response.

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

An autonomous foreign policy, however popular and economically beneficial, cannot solve all the problems of a Stalinist economy. After more than two decades of sustained spectacular growth, the Romanian economy is experiencing severe difficulties. Faced with inefficient if not incompetent management, excessive centralization, increasingly critical labor shortages, decreasing productivity, waste, corruption, worker indifference and consumer dissatisfaction, the RCP proposed structural reforms akin to those implemented in East Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1960's.⁹

The New Economic Mechanism, introduced with great fanfare in March, 1978, provided for the partial devolution of decision-making to industrial centrals and individual enterprises, the replacement of gross output as the authoritative indicator of performance with a vaguely defined "net profit," profit-sharing and worker self-management. Planners scaled down overly ambitious production and investment targets and promised more and better goods and services for the long-suffering Romanian citizen.¹⁰ Encountering bureaucratic resistance and public confusion, the reforms have yet to be fully implemented. Worker participation in economic decision-making is skeptically received by wary Romanians to whom it seems just another of the regime's interminable mobilization campaigns.

While it may be argued that Romania has experienced a "revolutionary breakthrough" with the elimination of alternative sources of political values, the creation of the new Romanian socialist man is proving more difficult. The RCP is currently devoting considerable time and effort to political socialization. Specific recent objectives of the process include the establishment of the party as the legitimate repository of the national heritage; the creation of a bond between the RCP and the people; the de-Westernization of Romanian cultural and social patterns; and the internalization of the "Communist work ethic." Vehicles for the process have included the continued Romanization of both domestic and foreign policy; ritualistic popular participation; cultural Stalinism; and repeated campaigns to mobilize the population for the achievement of party goals.

Although it is most probably stimulated by economic prescriptions, Romania's un-Russian foreign policy has elicited popular support. Complementing legitimizing foreign policy, the RCP has pursued nationalistic domestic policies that were clearly designed to tap the wellspring of popular Russophobia under the veneer of official Romanian-Soviet friend-

ship. Most noticeably, place names were de-Russified and Romanian orthography and philology were de-Slavicized. Romania reclaimed its Latin origin. Historians were directed to rediscover Romania's rich and varied past, even the "Romanian-ness" of Soviet Moldavia (Bessarabia). Marxism-Leninism itself was de-Russified. In a curious permutation of the conventional (i.e., Soviet) interpretation, Romanian ideologues postulated that Marxism-Leninism was valid first in its national manifestations and only then, cumulatively, in its universal form. Ceaușescu reinterpreted the vast sweep of Romanian history to prove that the RCP alone was the legitimate heir of the national destiny, emphasizing themes of continuity with the past rather than revolutionary breaks with it. Thus the RCP, once the most slavish imitator of all things Soviet, sought to claim Romania's unique past, present and future. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the party achieved its purpose, as much because of a lack of viable alternatives as the persuasiveness of its arguments.¹¹

The reawakening of Romanian nationalism is decidedly unfortunate for one large segment of society—the ethnic minorities. Especially affected are the Hungarians of Transylvania, who were afforded their own "autonomous region" between 1952 and 1968. While Ceaușescu has rhetorically (and the government has statistically) emphasized the ethnically non-discriminatory nature of Romanian "socialist patriotism," there is growing evidence of the pernicious

effects of the RCP's assimilationist policy, which progressively deprives Romanian Hungarians of their cultural identity.¹² Given the virulent nationalism used by the regime in its quest for legitimacy and the centuries-old Romanian animosity toward the Hungarians, institutional and individual discrimination is not surprising and is, perhaps, unavoidable. Officially sanctioned Hungarian protests, Western charges of "cultural genocide," and Budapest's subservience to Moscow in foreign policy and party matters encourage the average Romanian's perception of the Hungarian minority as a potential fifth column—"surrogate Russians"—to be distrusted and reviled.

Despite its proportionally large and socially representative membership, the RCP has yet to overcome the average citizen's traditional antipathy for and suspicion of political authority. The party has attempted to mitigate this shortcoming without much success. "Socialist democracy," the participation of the masses in political and economic decision-making, is not taken seriously by most Romanians. "Contested" elections for state offices fail to elicit expected enthusiasm. Organizational penetration of society through a plethora of committees, clubs and councils is skeptically, albeit accurately, perceived more as mobilization than participation. Educational institutions, frequently criticized by RCP leaders, were recently "polytechnized" by law and were urged to devote more effort to instilling the values of the "new man," most prominently the "socialist work ethic."¹³ After allowing limited artistic experimentation during the 1960's, since 1971 the RCP has insisted on a return to uplifting socialist realism. Ceaușescu has defined culture as a vehicle for political socialization. If the process were succeeding, party leaders would not be so critical so frequently.

The regime's response to the Jiu Valley miners' strikes of August, 1977, was characteristic of its neo-Stalinism. Ceaușescu personally intervened in the crisis and promised to redress the miners' grievances. The government and party bureaucrats responsible for that sector of the economy were rotated to different duties. Strike leaders were dispersed to their villages. The military and the police made a show of force.

Ceaușescu's Romania is irrefutably one of the world's most personalist regimes. There are several recognizable elements in "Ceaușescuism," the most obvious of which is a personality cult rivaling those of Stalin and Mao. Nicolae Ceaușescu's party and state titles seem endless.¹⁴ Poetry, art and music portray him as an original Marxist-Leninist theorist, a man of the people, a competent administrator, and a devoted patriot. They praise his intelligence, his courage, his selflessness and his commitment, and identify him as the present incarnation of a long line of Romanian national heroes—Burebista, Decebal, Stephen the Great, Michael the Brave, Alexander Ion Cuza. His

¹¹See Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs*; Stephen Fischer-Galati, *Twentieth Century Rumania* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970); and, Robert R. King, *History of the Romanian Communist Party* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1980).

¹²See Gilberg, *Modernization in Romania*, pp. 207-238; Mary Ellen Fischer, "Nation and Nationality in Romania" in George W. Simmonds, ed., *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin* (Detroit: Detroit University Press, 1977), pp. 504-521; and Robert R. King, *Minorities Under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 146-169.

¹³George Cioranescu, "Law on Education and Instruction: 'Red or Expert?'" Radio Free Europe, Background Report/30 (Romania), February 6, 1970; Anneli Maier, "The Romanian Congress of Education and Instruction," Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report/57 (Romania), March 11, 1980.

¹⁴According to a 1979 CIA publication which did not include *all* government and party organizations, Nicolae Ceaușescu was President of the Republic, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, General Secretary of the RCP, President of the State Council, and Chairman of the Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development, the National Council of Working People, the Socialist Unity Front, the Academy of Social and Political Sciences (Honorary), . . . ad infinitum. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Directory of Officials of the Socialist Republic of Romania, a Reference Aid*, CR 79-15012, September, 1979.

rule is justified by his genius and by destiny, and its legitimacy is at once secular and mystical. He is both a Bolshevik and a Bourbon.

Explanations for the cult range from a practical need to focus on Romanian nationalism to egomaniacal paranoia. Many Romanian intellectuals, to whom the cult is alternately distasteful and amusing, believe that their essentially peasant and Romanian (Greek) Orthodox culture facilitates its existence. The impartial observer must also credit Ceausescu with being an able leader and a canny politician. Few contemporary leaders are as astute an analyst of Soviet intentions and international opportunities; few Communist bosses so adroitly manipulate personnel, all but eliminating the possibility that a rival could establish a power base within the "apparat."¹⁵ Few politicians have such an acute sense of timing, knowing precisely when and how to play on popular emotions. Ceausescu is a tireless "campaigner," with a schedule of visits, meetings, inspections and speeches that would tax the energies of a man of half his 63 years.¹⁶

Another element of "Ceausescuism" which has attracted the attention and scorn of both Romanian and Western observers is a nepotism which, while not atypical for traditional Balkan politics, seems out of place in a Marxist-Leninist regime. Elena Ceausescu, the President's wife, is acknowledged to be the second most powerful person in the country. Her official responsibilities give her control of science and technology and, more recently, the RCP's cadre policy. In the past few years, Romania's "first comrade" has attracted her own personality cult. Their son, Nicu, is secretary of the Union of Communist Youth. Ceausescu's numerous brothers and in-laws, perhaps as many as two dozen in all, fill other important party and government posts. While culturally consistent, the Ceausescu nepotism calls into question the regime's stated goal of creating a socialist meritocracy.

¹⁵See Mary Ellen Fischer, "Political Leadership and Personnel Policy in Romania: Continuity and Change, 1965-1976" in Steven Rosefielde, ed., *World Communism at the Crossroads: Military Ascendancy, Political Economy, and Human Welfare* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 210-233.

¹⁶Not all RCP members support the cult. At the 1979 Twelfth RCP Congress veteran Communist Constantin Pîrvulescu vigorously attacked "Ceausescuism." Patrick Moore, "The Romanian Communist Party's 12th Congress: A Preliminary Review," Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report/263 (Romania), November 28, 1979.

¹⁷Robert R. King, "The Blending of Party and State in Romania," *East European Quarterly*, December, 1978, pp. 489-500.

¹⁸For further elaboration see my "Romania: Value Transformation in the Military," *Studies in Comparative Communism* vol. 11, no. 3 (1978), pp. 237-249, and "Romanian Military Policy in the 1980s" in Nelson and Fischer-Galati, *op. cit.*

¹⁹See Kenneth Jowitt, "Political Innovation in Rumania," *Survey*, Autumn, 1974, pp. 132-151.

Instead, as one Bucharest wit quipped, it appears to be "socialism in one family."

There is also an explicit fusing of state and party functions from the national to the local level.¹⁷ At the national level, for example, Nicolae Ceausescu is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and chairman of the National Defense Council, the body responsible for Romanian military policy. The council is dually subordinated to the central committee of the RCP and the government. While military units are under the direction of the Ministry of National Defense, the paramilitary Patriotic Guards report to the central committee.¹⁸ At the local level, the party secretary is also, by law, the chairman of the people's council. While overlapping directorates occur frequently in Communist party-states, in Romania the fusing of functions is legally explicit. The policy of "hierarchical unification and organizational compression" centralizes all power in the party's (i.e., Ceausescu's) hands, theoretically increasing efficiency and decreasing the bureaucracy's vulnerability.¹⁹

Although it may be argued that the regime's centralism creates efficient vertically integrated structures necessary for the command economy, it concurrently impedes modern elites' access to all but symbolic decision-making. Ceausescu expects Romania's managers to be both "red" and "expert," but he delegates so little authority to specialists that incentives for innovating risk-taking are nonexistent. While such practices perpetuate Ceausescu's peculiar brand of monocracy, they fashion a polity unable to adapt to the opportunities of technological change. The regime seems to be willing to accept that sacrifice to avoid the dangers of pluralism. Orthodox domestic policies are also thought to decrease the potential excuses for Soviet intervention, thus allowing Romania greater freedom in international affairs with significant economic and legitimizing benefits.

Public dissent is not tolerated in Ceausescu's Romania, although dissidents challenge the party's authoritative definitions of the Romanian political community, the nature of the relationship between the individual and the state, the standards of individual and group behavior, and the regime's allocation of scarce resources. As yet unwilling to admit the validity of even the managed pluralism of Hungary and

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"In light of the ethno-regional complexities and internal tensions that define Yugoslavia, it comes as no surprise that the Yugoslav Marxist variant underscores institutional permanence and stability. As of this writing, the Yugoslav system after Tito is functioning with remarkable calm and striking effectiveness, although only time will reveal whether it will endure."

Leadership and Change in Yugoslavia

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PERHAPS the most important feature of post-Tito Yugoslavia is the fact that the system founded by Josip Broz Tito continues to operate efficiently. Key governmental institutions that were designed in part with Tito's death in mind (e.g., the collective state presidency) are working, if not perfectly, at least well enough to avert serious domestic crises.¹

Two events before Tito's illness were important to the stability of the Yugoslav political system after Tito's death in May, 1980. First, during and subsequent to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Yugoslavs established and developed the Yugoslav People's ("all-people's defense") Army, based on the historic experience of successful Yugoslav resistance to the Germans. This development strengthened the military in Yugoslav society, a process which still continues, and cemented the linkage between the army elite and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). In addition, given the local-unit aspect of an "all-people's defense" system, the leaders of the LCY and the army cultivated elements of the local population (while retaining highly centralized organization structures).

Second, after more than 40 amendments to the 1963 Yugoslav constitution during the period 1967 to 1971,² and the purging of unreliably ambitious elements from republic leadership circles (especially in

Croatia), there was a critical period of consolidation and recentralization of party power and authority during the 1970's. Many Yugoslavs—in the party and among other groups—believed that the Yugoslav system of decentralization had gone too far. As a result, changes designed to strengthen the active role of party members in the government process were given legal expression in the 1974 constitution.³

Perhaps the single most important innovation was a collective state presidency of nine members, one member from each republic and each province, with the head of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as the ninth and ex officio member.⁴ Significantly, the head of the Yugoslav party organization was added as an "automatic" (albeit ex officio) member of the collective presidency, to provide a link between the party and the government, a new and formal linkage.

More recently, while Tito was hospitalized, the collective state presidency was enlarged to include 15 members. This expanded collective state presidency, with seven ex officio members holding various government and party posts, was to be called "in case of emergency or other unforeseeable situations," i.e., these ex officio members were to be "invited" to attend meetings when special need and circumstance arose. The strengthened and expanding role of the military and the revised collective state presidency with its ex officio members, coupled with the purging of younger, more ambitious local party leaders during the early 1970's, effectively defined the political context for the leadership transition. Tito was moving into his late eighties, and concern over the deterioration of his health was growing; thus it became increasingly imperative to prepare the institutional context for political stability and order in the post-Tito era.

Since 1950, the all-pervasive Yugoslav socialist institution has remained the "workers' self-management" system, a feature of Yugoslav Marxist ideology that has been reaffirmed repeatedly. A more recent elaboration of this concept resulted in "social self-management," which proceeds by viewing all activities (economic, social welfare, educational, political) within a given locale or socioeconomic community as an integral part of a single interlocking system.

¹For an informed and balanced view of the succession in Yugoslavia, see: Gary K. Bertsch, "Yugoslavia: The Eleventh Congress, the Constitution and the Succession," *Government and Opposition* (Winter, 1979) pp. 96-110.

²For an official yet scholarly treatment of constitutional reform in Yugoslavia see Nikola Filipovic, ed., *Ustavna reforma (Constitutional Reform)*, (Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politicki studij, 1971).

³Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 265-280; and, *Ustav SFR Jugoslavije, Ustav SR Hrvatske (Constitution of the SFR Yugoslavia, Constitution of the SR Croatia)* (ekspoze Jakova Blazevica) (Zagreb: Politicke teme, 1974).

⁴Adam Roberts, "Yugoslavia: The Constitution and the Succession," *The World Today* (April, 1978), pp. 142-144; *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Beograd: Secretariat for Information of the Federal Executive Council, 1963); *Ustav SFR Jugoslavije, op. cit.*

The consistent support of this concept over the years indicates that the personal experience of influencing the immediate life-sustaining environment is the guiding principle in Yugoslav Marxism.⁵

The Yugoslav view of community and group decisional self-determination was strengthened by the concept of "associated labor," which was a key ingredient of the 1974 constitution and is viewed as an extension of the self-management principle. Groups of individuals designated as "associated labor" are formed out of a wide range of social, agricultural, economic, professional and political experience at various levels. Under the 1974 constitution and subsequent Yugoslav law,⁶ these groups of associated labor are responsible for selecting and sending delegations to the republic (or provincial) and commune assemblies. Significantly, both the members of the LCY and the Yugoslav military are considered groups of associated labor and are entitled to send delegations to the various chambers of associated labor, at the republic (or provincial) and the commune levels.

The influence of the members of the LCY is enhanced by the position of their delegations in a variety of legislative organs and by the ex officio status of heads of LCY organizations on collective presidential bodies at various levels of government. Because of its special role in drawing up candidate lists and its entitlement to send delegates to chambers of associated labor, the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) also has a significant impact at all levels of government. Given the acknowledged close ties between SAWPY and the LCY, the activity of SAWPY further strengthens the role of the party in the Yugoslav system.

Formally defined government roles for the LCY and military personnel as groups of associated labor represent an apparent departure from earlier thinking. This new feature of the Yugoslav system stands in sharp contrast to the watchword of Yugoslav politics prominent during the 1960's, "divorcing the party from power." Newly defined legislative roles for Communist party members and military personnel, along with the tightening of party discipline and other recentralizing mechanisms, prepared the groundwork

⁵Dennis Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 192-197; and Najdan Pasic, "Self-Management—An Integral Social System," *Socialist Thought and Practice* (December, 1969), pp. 115-150.

⁶Zakon o udruzenom radu (*Law on Associated Labor*) (Zagreb: Narodne novine, 1977); and, in English, *The Associated Labour Act* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1977).

⁷Slobodan Stankovic, "Changes in the Yugoslav Army Party Organization," RAD Background Report/1 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, January 2, 1979.

⁸The New York Times, April 29, 1980, p. 6; and Slobodan Stankovic, "Milovan Djilas Called 'Black Renegade,'" RAD Background Report/167 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, July 18, 1980.

for a leadership system without Tito, within which constitutional legitimacy is given to the party and the military, as active "legal" entities within the political order.

RECENT LEADERSHIP CHANGES

Just before Tito's illness and hospitalization, two individuals were discussed as his possible successors: Edvard Kardelj, then the leading Yugoslav party theoretician, and Stane Dolanc, secretary of the LCY presidium through the early part of 1979. Kardelj, still a relatively young man, died on February 10, 1979, while Dolanc, with the loss of his party secretary post on May 16, 1979, apparently dropped from view as a potential successor. Consequently, with Tito's illness and death in 1980 and with little serious thought given to a single successor, the leadership transition was set into motion as Tito had apparently intended.

In effect, the leadership succession was to be viewed primarily as the efficient functioning of institutions (the collective state presidency, the party presidium, the rotation of office) rather than in terms of the strength of a given personality. This transition strategy provided the Yugoslavs with the wherewithal to deal with the controversies and problems inevitably accompanying change. In summary, a strengthened and more unified LCY, a military with growing numbers placed on influential bodies,⁷ a widely accepted Yugoslav socialist institution (i.e., workers' self-management), and the new collective state presidency—all combined to provide the necessary fulcrum for stabilizing the change in Yugoslav leadership.

In 1979, the deteriorating condition of Tito's health caused growing concern. By January 15, 1980, the Yugoslav People's Army was on "partial alert," with a stern warning to the Soviet Union that despite Tito's illness and incapacity Yugoslavia was a society fully in control of its destiny. A few days later, on January 20, Tito had his leg amputated; he spent the remaining months of his life hospitalized, and it became progressively more difficult for him to act as head of state and leader of the Yugoslav Communist party. In the course of 1980, Yugoslav state authorities took measures against dissidents and "internal agitators"; there were also reprimands and denunciations of Milovan Djilas for "anti-Yugoslav" articles he had written.⁸

These moves against "dissent and agitation" were made to avoid any possibility of the mobilization or stimulation of internal discontent by anti-Tito groups in the face of uncertainties about succession. Extensive discussions in the Yugoslav media focused on the virtues of the Yugoslav People's Army ("all-people's defense" system), its strategy in case of invasion, and the growing Yugoslav concern about the intentions of Warsaw Pact nations. In early 1980, preparations were being made for possible military

action in the event of foreign intrusion, while the acting Yugoslav political leadership began to deal with the problems that might arise in the event of domestic agitation after Tito's death.

On May 4, 1980, Tito succumbed to a variety of physical ailments that arose from complications after the amputation of his leg. Hence, an era in European as well as in Yugoslav political history came to an end. A number of Yugoslav leadership changes took place immediately. First of all, Stevan Doronjski, a Serb from the Vojvodina and chairman of the LCY presidium, assumed Tito's role as head of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; on June 12, 1980, Doronjski was formally elected to the new post of president of the party presidium (i.e., the party collective presidency of 23 members) by the Central Committee of the LCY. Second, Lazar Kolisevski, a Macedonian, who was acting head of state during Tito's illness, officially assumed the post of chairman of the state presidency, and became formal head of state. Third, Cvijetin Mijatovic, a Serb from Bosnia, was elected chairman of the collective state presidency at a meeting of that body on May 15 and, in accordance with the principle of rotation of office, took over as official head of state from Kolisevski. Finally, Lazar Mojsov, also a Macedonian, was elected president of the LCY presidium on October 2, 1980, and thus would assume the party leadership role after Doronjski.

These leadership changes took place without apparent difficulty or disruptions to the Yugoslav system. Institutions developed by Tito and his associates during Tito's later years and incorporated in the 1974 constitution and recent party rules worked rather well, with those holding public office serving out allotted terms and then relinquishing power to others in accord with prescribed procedure. Currently, the two key positions of authority in the Yugoslav system are held by a Serb, Cvijetin Mijatovic, chairman of the state presidency and hence formal head of state, and a Macedonian, Lazar Mojsov, president of the party presidium. Both men are expected to leave their posts when their allotted one-year terms of office expire. Given the increasing demands made by Bulgaria and the Soviet Union on the Macedonian issue, the current selection of Mojsov as head of the LCY⁹ (as well as the tenure of Kolisevski as head of state) may also reflect Yugoslav tactical considerations.

⁹Slobodan Stankovic, in "Lazar Mojsov—New Rotating President of the CC Presidium," stresses the point that Mojsov has the reputation of being a "strong critic" of Bulgarian and Soviet attitudes on the Macedonian issue. RAD Background Report/255 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, October 28, 1980.

¹⁰See the June, 1980, issue of *Socialist Thought and Practice*, which is devoted entirely to the concept of "self-management."

¹¹For an official Yugoslav assessment of economic growth, see: Anon, "Industrial Development, 1961-1977," *Yugoslav Survey* (May, 1979), pp. 117-148.

The overriding characteristic of Yugoslav political life since the illness, incapacitation and death of Tito has been the relative stability and orderliness of leadership change. Although some observers of Yugoslavia predicted internal strife and Soviet manipulation, the leadership change process in Yugoslavia has proceeded with dispatch and without major problems.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

In the past, commentators have frequently pointed to the volatile nature of Yugoslavia's economy; more recently, the association between a stable post-Tito political order and a healthy Yugoslav economic system has been discussed. The control and manipulation of economic process, however, has always been more difficult than the legislation of political institutional reform; the maintenance of a reasonably healthy Yugoslav economy has required both internal initiatives and assistance and cooperation abroad.

Over the years, the Yugoslav system has suffered from high rates of inflation and from the abuse of its structure of decentralized economic decision making. The Yugoslavs have become large-scale exporters of labor, a situation that has benefited the Yugoslav economy on two counts—first, the return of these workers with their hard West European currencies to Yugoslavia and, second, the relief of the domestic unemployment rate. The Yugoslav dinar, although floated freely on the international monetary exchange (the only East European Communist state to take such a risk), has gone through periodic devaluations over the years in order to keep pace with changing monetary values in the West.

Economists (Yugoslavs and foreigners) have acknowledged the "hidden costs" and the inefficiencies of a decentralized workers self-managed economy; yet the Yugoslav leadership has kept its faith in this institution, which continues to be the core element of the Yugoslav variation on Marxist ideology.¹⁰ On the other hand, within the broad range of existing underdeveloped and transitional societies, the Yugoslav economic system has fared rather well. Its rate of economic growth has been impressive¹¹ (despite the high inflation rates); the products of Yugoslav industry have been increasingly competitive on the world market; and Yugoslavia has won the confidence of West European neighbors in the European Economic Community (EEC).

The Yugoslav federal budget for 1979 reflected an increased expenditure of 9 percent over the previous year's budget, with the military defense component accounting for approximately 53 percent of the total figure of over \$5.2 billion. The 53 percent figure for defense costs represented a substantial increase over the 42 percent of the previous year, reflecting the growing fear of possible foreign intervention in the

wake of Tito's incapacity. This growing attention to defense expenditures was paralleled by the increased placement of military personnel on party and government bodies.

As to the state of Yugoslavia's economy, the rate of inflation in Yugoslavia for 1978 was in the 16-to 20-percent range, but was estimated to have increased to the 23- to 30-percent level for 1979. The rapid growth of the trade deficit over the last few years was not encouraging—\$2.5 billion in 1976, escalating to over \$6 billion by 1979. As a result, both Yugoslav and foreign economists expressed deep concern about the future stability of the Yugoslav economy. To summarize, the three major foci of concern have been the runaway inflation rate, the unfavorable balance of trade, and the high unemployment level. Some observers blame the apparent chaos of the decentralized (i.e., workers self-management) structure of the economy for these economic difficulties. However, in the official view, the future of the Yugoslav economy and societal improvement depends on further economic and political decentralization. It is also believed that a stable economy and a steady pace of economic improvement are essential for a smooth post-Tito leadership transition.

In an interview in the *Financial Times* (London) on June 5, 1980, after enumerating well-known Yugoslav economic problems, Stane Dolanc reaffirmed the conviction that a freer market and an enlarged private sector, all within the confines of Yugoslav decentralized socialism, would help remedy Yugoslavia's economic problems. Earlier, despite the gloomy economic indicators, optimism and support for continued Yugoslav economic growth were expressed, not only by the Yugoslavs themselves, but also by the leaders of West European nations, and in particular by members of the EEC. On April 2, 1980, the Yugoslav government signed a five-year agreement with the EEC providing for freer access to West European markets, a move indicating the possibility of increasing Yugoslav trade with the West and reducing Yugoslav trade relations with East Europe. Signatories to the agreement were also motivated by the hope that the Yugoslavs would reduce their trade deficit to around the \$1-billion level.

Given the rapidly deteriorating state of Tito's health, West European leaders felt that it was advisable to help Yugoslavia. Reinforcing this West

¹²Zdenko Antic, "New Soviet-Yugoslav 10-Year Agreement," RAD Background Report/249 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, October 20, 1980.

¹³Zdenko Antic, "Yugoslavia De-values the Dinar," RAD Background Report/142 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, June 13, 1980.

¹⁴Zdenko Antic, "From Belgrade to Havana and After," RAD Background Report/195 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, September 17, 1979; for the text of Tito's

European view was the optimistic forecast of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the anticipated results of Yugoslavia's effort to control and reduce its trade deficit. Significantly, shortly thereafter, in October, 1980, the Soviet Union concluded its own economic agreement with the Yugoslav government, one extending over a 10-year period and anticipating a 60-percent increase in trade.¹² In pursuing this trade option with the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavs were consistent in applying their established principle of seeking the advantage of constructive ties with both East and West.

Toward the end of 1980, despite the official view that the practice of decentralized controls will continue, some official measures were taken that suggest the internal tightening of discipline and policy. On September 16, 1980, Petar Kostic, the Yugoslav Finance Minister, announced that fundamental economic measures would be applied. First, the "interbank foreign exchange market" was to be re-established as a way of correcting the widespread abuse by enterprises that sold foreign currencies above official exchange rates. Second, the Yugoslav federal government was to be the sole responsible authority for balance of payments, instead of permitting each republic to handle its own. The Yugoslav government also announced that two loans from foreign governments had been negotiated, one from Kuwait and the other from Austria; these loans were expected to help the Yugoslavs to buttress and continue the development of their economy despite an unfavorable trade balance, while still more loans were being negotiated. On June 6, 1980, the Yugoslav government had devalued its currency by 30 percent, leading to a decrease in imports of 9 percent and an increase in exports of 9 percent; this measure thus provided some immediate help toward alleviating the pressures of a defective balance of trade.¹³ In addition, Yugoslav authorities introduced periodic and selective price freezes as a way of coping with their problems.

Since the break with the Soviet Union in 1948, the Yugoslavs have taken pride in their independence from both world power centers and have cultivated third world political ties. Nonetheless, Yugoslav leadership has maintained constructive and balanced relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the illness and death of Tito, both superpowers have made gestures toward improving relations with Yugoslavia; Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev attended Tito's funeral in May, 1980, while President Jimmy Carter visited Belgrade in June. The prestige of Yugoslavia among nonaligned states continued despite the death of Tito and persists, in large part because of Tito's successful handling of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's challenge at the September, 1980, Havana conference.¹⁴ In general, the Yugoslavs

have made effective use of relations with and leadership of the third world as a way of reinforcing their own autonomy.

Since the 1948 rupture between Moscow and Belgrade, the Yugoslav regime has periodically tried to reestablish closer ties with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Yugoslavs received economic and other assistance from the United States during a difficult period of adjustment resulting from a boycott by East European states. Over the years, the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia have been cordial and mutually supportive, with unmistakable caution nonetheless on the part of both parties. The offhand remark by presidential candidate Carter during the 1976 campaign to the effect that Yugoslavia was not of sufficient interest to the United States to justify taking appropriate measures in the event of Soviet action was bewildering to the Yugoslavs. Since that time, however, the United States has been developing constructive and supportive ties with the Yugoslav government.

Yugoslav leadership has continued to be mindful of the need to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, however strong the Yugoslav inclination to move closer to the West. Thus, with issues of non-alignment coming into focus and the approaching Havana conference scheduled for September, 1979, Tito made an official visit of friendship to Moscow on May 16-18, to discuss issues of mutual interest. However, through the 1978-79 period, the Yugoslav press continued persistently to emphasize the effectiveness of the Yugoslav "all-people's army" and its defense capabilities, and stressed the country's preparation to effect a smooth leadership transition in the post-Tito era. The messages being conveyed to Moscow were unambiguous. On the Polish situation, the Yugoslav media gave extensive press coverage to the official visit by Pope John Paul to his native Poland during early June, 1979, a media coverage policy in bold contrast to that of other East European Communist states. The Yugoslav government also took a dim view of Soviet intrusions into Afghanistan, and on January 6, 1980, Yugoslavia condemned the Soviet military intervention in that country. By way of contrast, the Yugoslav delegation at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting on February 14 abstained on a vote condemning the Soviet Union for violations of human rights in Afghanistan.

address to the Havana conference see Josip Broz Tito, "The Historical Responsibility of the movement of Non-Alignment," *Socialist Thought and Practice* (October, 1979), pp. 3-14.

¹⁵For a review of political events during Tito's life, see "Josip Broz Tito, 1892-1980," *Socialist Thought and Practice* (May, 1980), entire issue; and Charles Andras et al., "The Tito Era in Yugoslavia," RAD Background Report/100 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 5, 1980.

Just before the amputation of Tito's leg on January 20, 1980, the United States issued a statement of support "for the unity, independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia," while the Yugoslav foreign ministry warned the Soviet Union and Bulgaria against interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, a gesture precipitated by Soviet and Bulgarian claims on the issue of Macedonia. In short, the relations of Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union, although proper and cordial, began to reveal higher tensions with the progressive deterioration of Tito's health.

The pattern of changing Yugoslav relations with the United States during this period reflected the reverse tendency. At a news conference on February 13, 1980, President Carter again stated that the United States would "take whatever action is necessary" to protect Yugoslavia from Soviet intrusion or domination, and that, under such circumstances, the United States would "seriously consider" giving aid to the Yugoslavs. Similarly, in a letter dated February 25 addressed to Tito, in response to an earlier appeal by Tito for preservation of East-West détente and world peace, President Carter reaffirmed the United States commitment to these goals and expressed once again his firm support for the continued autonomy and integrity of the Yugoslav state. The message being conveyed to Soviet leadership at this juncture was clear—the Soviet Union was not to intercede in Yugoslav domestic affairs during the period of transition. President Carter's statements were welcomed and reassured Yugoslav leaders. In addition, after four years of negotiation, the Yugoslavs arranged for the purchase of military equipment from the United States.

Nearly two months after the death of Tito, on June 24, 1980, President Carter made an official state visit to Yugoslavia.¹⁵ In a speech at a state dinner in Belgrade, he reaffirmed the friendship and support of the United States for Yugoslavia and for its continued development as an independent society. A joint communiqué issued the following day (June 25) called on all world leaders to respect the principles of the United Nations Charter, apparently an indirect reference to Soviet military activities in Afghanistan.

On the developing Polish crisis, the Yugoslavs have consistently supported the Solidarity labor movement

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON EAST EUROPE

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF EAST EUROPE: NEW APPROACHES. Edited by Ronald H. Linden. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980. 322 pages, \$27.95.)

Scholars on East Europe will find this collection of essays useful. Sarah Meiklejohn Terry's study of Soviet-Polish interdependency is especially noteworthy, essential reading for any understanding of the tumultuous events in Poland since the summer of 1980.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
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EUROCOMMUNISM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. Edited by Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta, and David P. Burke. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1980. 373 pages and index, \$32.50 cloth; \$9.95 paperback.)

This collection of 15 essays examines facets of Eurocommunism, that is, the self-conscious effort of nonruling Communist parties to discard violence and revolution and adapt to the democratic political systems on which they are based in order to acquire power through electoral means, and the efforts of East European parties to gain greater autonomy.

The range of topics by leading authorities in the Soviet-East European field is impressive. The essays analyze the origins, dynamics, evolution, and prospects of "Eurocommunism" and its relationship to Soviet foreign policy.

A.Z.R.

THE LOGIC OF "NORMALIZATION": THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OF 21 AUGUST 1968 AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK RESPONSE. By Fred H. Eidlin. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 278 pages, selected bibliography and index, n.p.)

This study contributes to an understanding of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak response. Exploring a number of approaches to the theme, Professor Eidlin provides a critical evaluation of how we study Soviet foreign policy behavior.

A.Z.R.

TITO: THE STORY FROM THE INSIDE. By Milovan Djilas. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980. 185 pages, \$9.95.)

Milovan Djilas, once a leading Communist and Tito's intimate aide, has written an absorbing profile of the Yugoslav leader who died in May,

1980. Tito, the shrewd, pragmatic, forceful political figure, was also vain, luxury-loving and obsessed by his public image. But Tito was also a keen and courageous defender of his country's independence.

A.Z.R.

BACKGROUND TO CRISIS: POLICY AND POLITICS IN GIerek's POLAND. Edited by Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. 418 pages, \$27.50.)

The fall from power of Polish party leader Edward Gierek in the summer of 1980 provides a dramatic backdrop for this far-ranging collection of essays on his rule.

A.Z.R.

MARXISM-LENINISM AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By V. Kubáková and A.A. Crickshank. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. 411 pages, bibliography and index, \$40.00.)

Drawing on the writings of key Marxists and Leninists, the authors set out to construct and analyze a Communist theory of international relations. Formalistic in part, the study brings together material that will be of interest to specialists on Soviet affairs.

A.Z.R.

THE ROAD TO GDANSK: POLAND AND THE USSR. By Daniel Singer. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981. 256 pages, notes and index, \$15.00.)

East Europe specialist Daniel Singer writes of the history of the dissident movement in Poland, which led to the strike of the shipyard workers in Gdansk in the summer of 1980.

O.E.S.

FLASHPOINT POLAND. By George Blazynski. (New York: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1980. 416 pages, bibliography, notes and index, \$27.50.)

George Blazynski analyzes the position of Poland between 1970 and 1979. He believes that Poland is the key country in the Soviet bloc and that events in Poland have widespread repercussions in the other Soviet bloc countries. Written before the events of the last year in Poland, this book is an extensive account of Poland's relations with the Soviet Union.

O.E.S.

THE POLITICS OF GENOCIDE, vols. 1 and 2. By Randolph L. Braham. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 1269 pages, appendices, glossary and name and subject indexes, \$60.00.)

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THE TWO GERMANYS

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influence are compounded by possible infection from the Polish East.

Recent events in Poland are covered elsewhere in this issue. The concern here will be with the East German response to the rise of Solidarity and related events during the late summer and fall of 1980 in Poland.

The strike activities in Poland in July and August were at first completely ignored in the East German media. Two problems faced those who determine what news is fit to print in the GDR. The first problem was tactical. Those controlling information were painfully aware of the fact that most of the citizenry was being informed of the Polish strikes through visitors from the West and Western radio and television.

The second problem was conceptual: there is no such thing as a strike action in a socialist country. Strikes are an expression of "antagonistic contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie" according to the East German political lexicon.¹³ Were such contradictions possible in a socialist system? The silence in the media indicated an unwillingness to cope with this question. No mention was made of Polish strike action until August 20. At that time, the word was used without commentary as part of a straight news report. Those East Germans who had not been informed by Western sources must have been confused and troubled by the paucity of comment about events that were obviously of major significance and which were reported briefly on August 21, 22 and 23 in the SED party newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*.

Relief finally came on August 27 for those wishing an official explanation and analysis of the Polish events. This analysis was not that of the editorial staff of *Neues Deutschland*, nor did it emanate from the SED; rather the initial commentary came from the Soviet news agency Tass, which repeated the usual litany of foreign interventionists stirring up troubles in Poland in clear contravention of the Helsinki Final Accord.

The East Germans were particularly concerned about their possible intervention in Poland, recalling that East German elements had participated in the Czechoslovakian invasion of 1968. The meaning and symbolism of the 1968 events were burdensome enough, coming as they did just three decades after the Third Reich's occupation and annexation of Czechoslovakia. A German intervention in Poland even 41 years after the start of World War II would

have been a far more serious matter, given the residual resentments against Germans in Poland whether or not they were fraternal socialists coming to save the Poles from themselves and from foreign subversion.

It was with some easing of anxiety that the readers of *Neues Deutschland* learned on August 30 that Polish army units had arrived to participate in the "Brothers in Arms" WTO maneuvers in the GDR. At the same time it is interesting to note that Polish naval units did not take part in the exercises in the Baltic off Rostock. Whether or not this amounted to a preventive quarantine of sailors from Gdansk who might have shared Solidarity's values with the citizens of Rostock remains a matter of conjecture.¹⁴

In any case, the resignation of Polish party chief Edward Gierek raised new questions with uncomfortable implications for the GDR leadership. This was particularly the case in light of revelations, transmitted via the West, about corruption under the Gierek regime. The question about privilege and possible corruption among the GDR leadership emerged. Moreover the text of Stanislav Kania's acceptance speech, succeeding Gierek, which was published in full in *Neues Deutschland*, officially informed East German readers for the first time that the striking Polish workers were demanding an *independent* labor union.

The reaction of the GDR leadership to demands for independent unions was harsh and clear: such demands were "anti-socialist" and "counterrevolutionary" in character. The threat from the East to the structure of party-controlled unions was a potential threat to the SED regime, particularly combined with independent information from West Germany.

The events in Poland provided the GDR leadership with an opportunity to reassert their position in the Soviet bloc at the side of the Soviet Union. East German reports followed and elaborated on the Soviet line. The leadership also undertook negotiations with the Czechs to coordinate positions in controlling whatever damage might be done by the appeal of Solidarity and a possible cooperative military intervention in Poland.

The SED also used the Polish events to tighten internal control. As an external threat, the idea of an independent union and the example of the fallen leadership of the Polish United Workers party combined at least temporarily to secure the "open" GDR border with Poland and to warn the populace that foreign agents and agitation threatened the achievements of socialism in East Germany.

It should also be noted that the GDR is not as susceptible to the "Polish disease" as it might seem. Most important, the Catholic Church is only a minor factor in East Germany, where religious influence, such as it is, comes primarily from the Protestants.

¹³P.J. Winters, "Zur Reaktion der DDR auf die Ereignisse in Polen," in *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 13, no. 10 (October, 1980), p. 1014.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 1015.

There is no internal institutionalized challenge to the control of the SED in East Germany.

The relatively high standard of living in the GDR is also an immunizing factor. Some of the demands made by Solidarity are "givens" in the GDR, and this situation tends to reinforce East German feelings of cultural superiority vis-à-vis the Poles. These prejudices interact with traditions of discipline to keep the GDR intact and in line during difficult times.

CONCLUSION

The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany represent a divided Germany and symbolize a world divided between the embattled and sometimes crumbling superpower bloc. The GDR has risen from Soviet occupation to become a Soviet junior partner in East European affairs. At the same time, the GDR is deeply involved in competition with the capitalist West and is actively supporting Soviet foreign policies in Africa and the Middle East.

The Polish crisis of the second half of 1980 highlighted the problems faced by the East German leadership: legitimacy at home and acceptance abroad. The solidity and permanence of the GDR are not to be gainsaid. What is needed is broader and clearer knowledge about this "hinge" between East and West. ■

THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT IN POLAND

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ion on October 30 ended with another official statement of solidarity, and the Polish Communist press echoed reports from the U.S.S.R. Thus,

the Polish-Soviet alliance is not only the fullest guarantee of the independence of socialist Poland and the security of her borders, but it is also one of the key premises of the favorable shaping of our relations with other countries in Europe and the world.²⁹

Soviet economic assistance has also been represented as a sign of solidarity, while in actual fact it is probably yet another form of political pressure. During the August, 1980, Crimean talks, Edward Gierek reportedly secured a \$550-million hard currency loan to help cover interest payments on the large foreign debt. A subsequent Soviet pledge of an additional \$1.1 billion credit in exchangeable currencies was announced toward the end of 1980.³⁰ At that time,

²⁹ *Trybuna Ludu*, November 1, 1980.

³⁰ *The New York Times*, September 14, 1980; Warsaw Radio, December 2, 1980.

³¹ *Pravda* (Moscow), September 1, 20, and 27, 1980.

³² Prague Radio, September 5, 1980; *The New York Times*, November 14, 1980; *Christian Science Monitor*, December 8, 1980.

³³ *Pravda*, December 6, 1980.

Poland owed \$23 billion, which meant a 1981 payment of about \$8 billion in interest and principal.

The second front is an all-out propaganda campaign to pressure the Communist leadership into bringing the workers back under control. Several articles have appeared bearing such titles as "The Intrigues of Socialist Poland's Enemies," "Interference in Internal Affairs Is Inadmissible," and "Interference in Internal Affairs of Polish People's Republic Continues."³¹ They demonstrate Soviet insistence that external antisocialist influences rather than internal political problems caused the developments in Poland.

This theme has been amplified in the controlled press of other East European countries. After the signing of the Gdansk accord, East Germany and Czechoslovakia stepped up their allegations that "antisocialist" elements had infiltrated the workers' strike committees. Party officials and journalists maintained that dissident factions within Poland were coordinating activities with Western antisocialist forces. "Proof" of such interference was seen in the United States AFL-CIO pledge of financial assistance to Polish workers, a West German loan of DM 1.2 billion, and \$670 million in credits from the United States government.³²

Late in November, 1980, the most ominous side of Soviet and East European pressure became apparent: closing parts of the East German-Polish border and reports of troop movements along the Soviet-Polish border. Soviet military intervention seemed imminent until the unprecedented meeting of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow on December 5, 1980. Present at this summit were party leaders, Prime Ministers, foreign and defense ministers, and leading ideologists and security chiefs from member states. The communiqué reiterated earlier declarations that "... Poland was, is and will be a socialist government, a solid link in the aggregate family of socialist countries."³³

Military demonstrations along Poland's borders, the Warsaw Pact summit meeting and the two meetings of Kania with Brezhnev may have led to a reduction of tensions. But even if all remains calm along the borders, Poland nonetheless faces major economic and social difficulties. The events after mid-1980 caused industrial production to drop 17 percent below production for the same period during 1979. Thus, national income declined for the second year in a row, the first time this has happened in any East European country. With regard to these difficulties, the Polish regime must accommodate itself to the reforms already agreed on. These include proposed wage increases totaling approximately \$3.3 billion. Another pressing problem will be how the party intends to relate to and deal with the new independent trade unions, anathema to the U.S.S.R. and to all other Communist-ruled governments in

East Europe. In mid-February, 1981, Wojcieck Jaruzelski, the fourth Prime Minister in less than a year, called for a 90-day moratorium on strike activity, and the trade union Solidarity agreed to support this initiative.

In 1981, Poland seems to be on the threshold of change. The ruling party is faced with a choice: either permit limited participation by genuine workers, farmers and technocrats in the decision-making process or continue along the road leading to economic chaos, which can only bring with it more bloodshed and the further growth of political opposition. It is hoped that this message will be understood in Moscow, which alone can decide the outcome of developments now in progress.³⁴

³⁴See the outstanding analysis by Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé, "Poland's Proletarian Revolution," in *Policy Review* (winter, 1981), pp. 61-69.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, the two Moscow archloyalists, have been assigned the proxy role of pressuring the Poles from without. Their message is also aimed at the domestic audiences. The unpopular normalizers in Prague are concerned. Their worries did not start with the appearance of the mustached Walesa. One year earlier, in June 1979, the Polish Pope John Paul II undertook a triumphal trip to his native land in what some sages retroactively characterized as the dress rehearsal for 1980. At that time, the insecure Czechoslovak regime suspended relatively free travel to Poland and imposed a news blackout.

These measures were bound to fail. In addition to 80,000 Polish citizens who cross the border daily to reach their place of employment in Czechoslovakia (notably, in the north Moravian region of Ostrava), the Czechoslovak populace at large is tuned to Western broadcasts, and a substantial part of the country receives the West German or the Austrian television signal.

The Polish developments are a unique event in East Europe. Nobody—not even the official propaganda—has managed to deny the fundamentally working class character of the movement. The Polish workers apparently employ the classic Marxist weapon of a class struggle in exploitative societies—the strike—and they are not oblivious of Lenin's famous dictum about the main link in a chain: in this particular case the link is the demand to form independent trade unions that would replace the old unions, officially termed "the transmission belts" of the party.

Solidarity was organized and disciplined to such perfection that even the banning of vodka on the

premises held by the strikers was a success. Not a single window was broken, in contrast to the violence and bloodshed in the riots of 1970 and 1976. The mistakes of the past have thus far been avoided. (One of the past mistakes was the lack of cooperation with the intellectuals.)

Czechoslovak rulers have realized the gravity of the situation and acted accordingly. When Charter 77 representatives sent a letter of support to Solidarity on August 28, 1980, the signatories were arrested within 24 hours. Thomas Petryv, a young member of Charter 77, attempted to meet the Polish human rights activists at the border; for this initiative he was sentenced to two years in prison.²⁴

All the governments of East Europe realize the gravity of Polish developments, and so does the population. The Communist party, the monopolist of power, was forced to negotiate and append a signature to concessions that are far from insignificant. This is an interesting precedent for the entire region.

What has been the reaction of the Czechoslovak public? The observers, domestic as well as foreign, portray the average man in the street as a sympathizer, who does not expect any commensurate response on his home turf. Silent cheering for brave neighbors is accompanied by resignation and dispirited acquiescence to one's own fate. The deterioration of the economy has not yet affected the Czechoslovak living standard to such a degree that the discontent of the working class would pose a plausible threat to the regime. Intellectuals have been decimated for over a decade; thousands of them went into exile; even a greater number resorted to internal exile; and all that seems to be left are the gallant cohorts around Charter 77. The farming strata will not revolt, enjoying the relative tranquility of their oasis life.

As for the young people, those in their thirties are the most alienated generation. They reached adulthood in and around 1968, the year of exuberant hope and national humiliation. They are critical of their assessment of the Czechoslovak national character. They draw parallels between the Munich betrayal of 1938 and the Moscow betrayal of 1968, and ultimately they question why Czechoslovakia was established as an independent state. The young who are turning twenty in the 1980's are without illusions. They opt for narrow specialization and maximum insulation from political demands. To them, politics and involvement are dirty words. Detached skepticism is the most common posture.

PROSPECTS OF FRATERNAL COOPERATION

The Czechoslovak mode of governing in the "normalization" period has become an embarrassment even to some fraternal countries. Nowhere in East Europe is Moscow's dominance more keenly felt than in Czechoslovakia. At the United Nations, even the

²⁴Vestnik Ceskoslovenske Narodni Rady Americké, November, 1980, p. 3.

Bulgarian delegate manages to speak in English. Bohumil Chnoupek, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister (and an officer of the Soviet KGB, which he does not try to hide) addresses the General Assembly of the United Nations in Russian. The Czechoslovak government is among the most vigorous defenders of the propriety of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. According to Chnoupek's colleague, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mecislav Jablonsky, this military undertaking is a shining example of Soviet adherence to the norms of international law.²⁵

The Warsaw Pact powers initiated a program of integrating their forces. The journal *Ceskoslovensky Vojak* carried an enthusiastic story about an integrated artillery unit—one Czech, one East German, some others, plus a Russian commander.²⁶ However, this novelty is not as yet ripe enough to play any significant role in a punitive expedition against Poland, should the Brezhnev doctrine be invoked.

Whereas the invasion of Hungary in 1956 was solely the undertaking of the Soviet armed forces, East German, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Polish units, too, were ordered to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Should the orders be given to march against Poland, it is reasonable to assume that the Kremlin would find it politically prudent to include fraternal units in the fulfillment of what is officially termed "the socialist international duty."

Any participation of its own army in an aggressive venture against the Poles would touch a very sensitive cord in Czechoslovakia's wounded national soul. The Czechoslovaks are fond of stressing (indeed, they have made a fetish of it) the fact that they have always been the victims not the perpetrators of violence. Last time they fought was in the seventeenth century, during the Thirty Years War, and they lost. Their armed forces did not fight in 1938, or 1948, or 1968. Having failed to take risks for the sake of their own country, if their troops took part in a punitive expedition on behalf of the Soviet interests, this would have a powerful impact, further alienating the population and making it difficult to envisage the point of any return.

The spread of the Polish virus is not inevitable. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the country has not yet recovered from its collision with the Soviet behemoth in 1968 and it is immune, for the time being, to experimental inflammation. As for the rest of the Soviet domain, the Polish fever does not have to be contagious; it has not been contagious in the past. The Poles preserved their Catholic Church as a powerful institution and did not collectivize their land. No fraternal country followed suit.

Early in 1981, a Soviet invasion of Poland seemed far from inevitable. The concessions granted to the trade unions may turn hollow or may be nibbled away, bite

by bite. Yet whatever the outcome, it is safe to assume that the 1980 events in Poland altered if not the mode, then certainly the image, of Communist governing. The monopolists of all power were forced to negotiate and bargain with genuine working class leaders—and the nation at large watched this humiliation on the television screen. After this, things will hardly ever be the same again. The precedent of demonopolizing the monopolists has already begun. ■

BULGARIA

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might have been Bulgarians in the past, but Sofia was willing to recognize them as Macedonians now if Belgrade would recognize the Pirin people as Bulgarians. On June 29, the Yugoslav foreign ministry rejected Zhivkov's offer as a sham (accusing Bulgaria of acting as a tool of Moscow) and continued to raise the nationality question. Each side accused the other of having designs on its territory.

Sofia responded on July 24, 1978, with a statement of the Bulgarian ministry of foreign affairs, "For All-Round Development of Bulgaro-Yugoslav Relations," which repeated the Bulgarian view of the Macedonian question, gave a brief history of the current dispute, and insisted that Sofia only wanted to live in peace and friendship with its Western neighbor. The debates and confrontations continued, with each side publishing documents and attempting to win over foreign public opinion. Unofficially, Sofia and the North American based-MPO have formed an unholy alliance to denounce the Yugoslav position. While the anti-Communist MPO and the Sofia government (which still denounces the fascist IMRO) do not want to be linked publicly, there is mutual admiration on some aspects of the Macedonian question. Former IMROists have been invited to and have attended Bulgarian scholarly conferences. MPO publications have been recommended to foreign scholars by Bulgarian officials; Bulgarian publications on Macedonia have been praised by the MPO journals.

A major argument of the Bulgarian foreign ministry was the fact that many contributors to Bulgarian civilization have come from the Macedonian region, including not only Communist leaders Blagoev and Dimitrov, but eminent Bulgarians like Paissi Hilendarski, the father of the Bulgarian nation; the Milandov brothers; Grigor Purlichev; and other figures of the Bulgarian national revival. Understandably, Sofia is sensitive when Skopje claims these historical figures as Macedonians. It is no surprise, then, that the climax of the Macedonian furor was reached in the summer of 1979, when Skopje announced it would feature the poet Nikola Vaptsarov of Bansko in the Pirin region for its annual Struga festival, a week of Macedonian literature.

²⁵Mecislav Jablonsky, *Nova Mysl*, October, 1980, p. 91.

²⁶Americke Listy, March 21, 1980.

Vaptsarov was a Bulgarian Communist and poet, who was executed by the royal Bulgarian government in 1942. Ever since the establishment of Fatherland Front power in 1944, Sofia has regarded him as the personification of the revolutionary worker-intellectual, the proletarian poet who laid down his life for the socialist cause and the freedom of his motherland—Bulgaria. Although this was not the first time, the audacity of the Skopje claim that he was a Macedonian national and their honoring him by reading Macedonian translations of his Bulgarian poetry were too much for the Bulgarians to bear. Sofia responded in full force. The Union of Bulgarian Writers published a statement reasserting Vaptsarov's Bulgarian nationality and harshly condemning the Macedonian officials responsible for the distortion. Vaptsarov's surviving relatives also publicly protested the festival, stating that the poet, like themselves, was Bulgarian. Copies of Vaptsarov's work permit were published, showing his nationality listed as Bulgarian.⁴

Since this incident, Nikola Vaptsarov has been constantly portrayed as a symbol of the nationality struggle. Television shows, newspapers, literary and political journals have all featured information, articles and stories about Vaptsarov. The November, 1979, issue of *Slavini*, Sofia's magazine for Bulgarians and Bulgarian descendants abroad, featured a famous painting of Vaptsarov as a worker on its cover, without his title or even his name. To the uninitiated, the picture is meaningless; to those aware of the controversy, however, it is a starkly eloquent political statement. The Communist worker-poet little known outside the two homelands who claim him has become a symbol of Bulgarian nationality.

In January, 1980, while Tito was on his deathbed, the French and Belgian press reported that two divisions were concentrated on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border to prepare for invasion. Sofia vigorously denied the reports and again insisted it sought an amelioration of the difficulties between the two countries. At the same time, Zhivkov sent a message to Tito wishing him recovery and expressing the hope that relations between their lands would improve. Relations between the two countries improved immediately. Delegations were exchanged; talks resumed; and the press war abated. In February, the Bulgarian embassy at Belgrade presented the university there a gift of Bulgarian books (presumably none dealing with Macedonia). Improvement continued after Tito's death, and the latest press reports from Sofia note there are "positive" trends in relations with Yugoslavia. Thus with startling abruptness the deep hostility, which at some points provoked talk of war, apparently abated. Indeed, questions of Macedonian and Bulgarian nationality are no longer front page stories in the Sofia press, but the question has not

⁴Sofia News, August 8, 1979.

been resolved. It still simmers and may at any moment boil up again. ■

THE KADAR YEARS IN HUNGARY

(Continued from page 163)

In Hungary, "comrades" are the holders of power and "Mr. S" or "Mrs. S" are all the others.¹⁷ The stratification between the rich and the poor is excessive; the rich—regardless of their class or class origin—proudly display their villas and their Mercedese, their electric or gas mowers and their manicured lawns, while the poor live, at best, in small crowded prefab apartments and curse at one another on the crowded buses and streetcars. And the party is less and less able to keep a semblance of humanism. The appearance of drugs—mostly marijuana at the present time—and of counterculture phenomena like punk and gang activities in the underpasses and in the suburbs of Budapest, does not bode well for the party. The presence of force must be made clearer.¹⁸ One can reclassify "political crimes" as "crimes against society"—as the recent new Code of Criminal Law did, to satisfy American hopes that there are no crimes against human rights in Hungary—but one cannot avoid a problem that is the natural result of Hungary's social development.

The regime is exceedingly careful, however, severely to restrict contact between the intellectual opposition and the masses. Intellectuals in opposition have been asked to break off their existing contacts, to cancel popular "underground university seminars," like the seminar on the history of the U.S.S.R., lest the regime be forced to move against them. The party leadership is concerned to avoid "another Poland" and is not afraid of taking unpopular measures against those whom they regard as threats to the system. The category of the commission of crimes against the "community" is apparently designed as a ready, though not notorious, handle to use against any opposition.

LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS

Within the party, of course, the lines are always blurred, and enormously complex problems are facing the leadership. First and foremost is the problem of succession to Kadar and his own leadership. Communist states have always been characterized by a longevity of personal leadership and Kadar's tenure has been longer than that of any other neighboring Communist leader, with the exception of Yugoslavia's Tito and Albania's Enver Hoxha. In spite of his chronic kidney problems, Kadar and his followers

¹⁷Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁸Mihály Sükösd, "Beatrice," *Elet és Irodalom*, May 12, 1979, p. 16, and János Kóbányai, "A szolidaritási ütközöt" [The Solidarity Battle], *Valóság*, vol. 6 (1979), p. 58.

were reelected for another five years after the twelfth party congress in 1980; but the problem of succession remains acute. Kadar has generally surrounded himself either with grey apparatchiks, among whom only a very few, like Gyorgy Aczel, possess charisma, or with bright technocrats, like Istvan Huszar or Gyorgy Lazar, who excel only in administration.

PARTY TROUBLES

The views within the leadership are polarized. There are those who intend to hew more closely to the Moscow line, including individuals like Dezso Nemes, Mihaly Korom or Jozsef Marjai, and there are those who believe that Hungary's national heritage and special circumstances demand a national or popularly endorsed road to socialism. Kadar is exceedingly skillful in manipulating the various groups; he appears to follow the shifting opinion of the elite. In reality, however, he remains in complete control and his leadership is never in doubt. But because of his longevity, the regime lacks younger people who could replace the leadership, and the heir apparent—currently Karoly Nemeth—has serious identification problems.

It is not only age that troubles the party leadership. The party's own apparat is also divided between such bright technocrats as the agricultural specialist Ervin Zsuffa, and those who have climbed the ladder of success by virtue of their apparatchik past. The latter are concerned with stability, the former with performance. The latter are closely identified with the enormous apparat of the party, the former with a wide variety of organizations, among which the party is only one group. And the conflict between these two elements, coupled with the fact that the party leadership has been unable or unwilling to make hard decisions and force their implementation, indicates that there will be problems in the coming months.

It must also be noted that political opposition to the party is not focused around a single ideology or a single leader. Kadar's style does not make martyrs; those who are ousted, like Rezso Nyers, or Lajos Feher, have been assigned to the wings and cannot return. They were forced to "correct their mistakes" or to dismantle their programs before they were relegated to unimportant political posts. They may influence people, but they will never again play important political roles. Thus Kadar has assured the apparat's (and his own) permanent political success, but he has not been able to create a loyal opposition that might contribute to the inventive restructuring of society.

Paradoxically, one of the regime's greatest problems is its inability to enforce decisions that have been made by the party and the government. A senior government official who enjoys good relations with Western sources complained to the author that

we are supposed to operate in a system where the party makes the decisions and the transmission belts follow orders. In reality, however, precisely because we have rapidly developed a complex organization, we do make—after enormously complicated negotiations among the many groups represented within the party elite—certain decisions, but we have no way to implement them. We can ask, admonish, cajole, but because a key characteristic of the Kadar style is that no one be summarily replaced, we merely reshuffle stupid or unsuccessful managers from one post to another, usually within the same branch where they have already failed before. There is never anyone who is responsible for anything, never a person who could "summarily" be fired or be quickly replaced by someone better. Only grey persons, with grey and rarely known *padrons* at unknown places, with ready and often plausible excuses why they haven't done yet what they were supposed to have done a long time ago. Until personal responsibility can be laid on individuals, until the culprit is called openly by name in the press to account for the harms and mistakes done, we will never be able to move forward in the direction our national interests demand.

Finally, none of Hungary's problems can be resolved merely by means of a "confrontation" within the party leadership. The resolution to all these problems is intertwined with the relationship between Hungary and the Soviet Union. Even in those issues that seem to be purely domestic, the Soviet connection is paramount; the Soviet Union intervenes directly or indirectly in all issues where it feels that its own domestic or external relations may be at stake. And Soviet intervention is crucial and must be taken into account in nearly all decisions, from raising the price of gas or selling chickens on the world market, to allowing the publication of books or reforming history textbooks.

One should not make any mistake: Hungary remains a tightly controlled state in which the party is fully in control, a socialist state in which the dictatorship of the party is unchallenged. Although it is true that the party is often unable to implement central decisions, that inability must be regarded as endemic, because of the development policies adopted by the party during the last decade. In reality, the failures are due to the very successes of the system and Kadar and the leadership must deal with these failures in the coming decade. ■

ROMANIA

(Continued from page 172)

Poland, the regime suppresses all forms of dissent; but the government has recently become more sophisticated and discriminating in its response, balancing the need to silence its critics with the potential international and domestic repercussions of suppression.

Aware of the disaffection of Romanian workers, the government chose to deal quickly and harshly with the trade unionists. Their potential domestic audience

was large, and they enjoyed little international support. Religious dissidents, like the Orthodox priest Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitrescu and the Baptist activist Pavel Niculescu, both involved with the "Committee for the Defense of Religious and Spiritual Freedoms," have also been imprisoned. Frequent intensive campaigns against "superstition" have had little effect; Romanians of all ages retain profound religious beliefs that challenge the party's authoritative definition of values.

Ethnic dissent requires the most measured response both because of the size of the minority populations and because of the scrutiny of international public opinion. One of the most unfortunate by-products of contemporary Romanian nationalism is the state's assimilationist policies toward the minorities.

Minority dissent poses a particularly precarious dilemma for Ceaușescu. His government can risk neither a harsher response to minority protests, for fear of adverse internal and foreign reaction, nor any great relaxation of its ethnocentric policies, for fear that its increasingly inflated nationalist currency of legitimacy will become altogether valueless.

Because the Romanian regime has sought its legitimacy in the international environment, it is particularly sensitive to international events. The discontent of Polish workers, the establishment of free Polish trade unions, the Polish party's inability to deal with economic problems, and the danger of Soviet intervention in Poland have all attracted Romanian attention. The workers' plight in Romania is similar, and the regime has tried to prevent the possibility of contagion. The party has emphatically repeated that each party must meet and solve its own problems without outside intervention. Despite the deteriorating situation in Poland, Soviet intervention would be a dangerous reiteration of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

At the same time, Ceaușescu has lashed out at the Polish party's mistakes and the structural inadequacies of Poland's minimally mixed economy. His denunciation of Solidarity as anti-socialist and his rhetorical stress on international socialist solidarity were as rigidly orthodox as any reactions in Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union. Ceaușescu also tried to prevent any spillover of the Polish unrest by emphasizing better production and distribution of cheaper consumer goods and services and by assuring workers of the democratic nature of Romanian trade unions. He inspected markets and visited potential Romanian Gdansk. Unlike Poland's pluralism and relative free-

dom, however, Romania's Stalinist monocracy lacks the prerequisites for large-scale protests.

Romania's orthodoxy in its reaction to the Polish crisis underscores an analytical trap for Western observers. Because of the attention given to Romania's occasional autonomy in foreign affairs, it is too often assumed that deviation from the Soviet line is the rule rather than the exception in Romania. Precisely the opposite is true. Soviet-Romanian relations remain good, although they are strained from time to time by Romanian rejection of specifically hegemonic Soviet policies. In most foreign and practically all domestic policy areas, a well-defined community of Soviet-Romanian interests and goals exists. The highly publicized Romanian deviations are embarrassing, annoying, even aggravating, but they pose no threat to Soviet security or the U.S.S.R.'s European strategic position. They have little effect on bloc cohesion or ideological conformity. In short, they are not overly dangerous for the Soviet Union. Thus, Soviet responses have been largely symbolic. The Soviet leadership is aware of Ceaușescu's strategy for legitimization and prefers to humor his nationalism, in the expectation that economic necessity and underlying ideological orthodoxy will impose realistic limits on his freedom of maneuver. In the final analysis, the ultimate guarantee of Romanian communism remains Soviet force.

UNITED STATES POLICY

The United States is equally realistic. Romania's unenviable human rights record notwithstanding, successive American administrations have rewarded Bucharest's foreign policy autonomy with exchanges of presidential visits, "most favored nation" status, increased trade, access to international sources of credit, and diplomatic support during Romanian-Soviet crises.²⁸ Friendly relations with Romania have provided Washington with diplomatic opportunities which otherwise would have remained inaccessible.²⁹ Nonetheless, the United States, while wishing to encourage greater autonomy among the East European states, does not seek to destabilize the region. The risks of inciting Soviet paranoia are too great. Washington seeks to build economic, political and cultural bridges to the bloc countries, establishing mutually beneficial relations. Romania remains on the periphery of American interests within the shadow of Soviet-American relations.

Ceaușescu's Romania continues its search for legitimacy. Thus far it has found only temporary popular support through its manipulation of nationalism. Given Romania's economic difficulties and the regime's inability to cope with them, additional, primarily material, incentives for normative commitment are increasingly crucial but they are correspondingly difficult to formulate. ■

²⁸President Ceaușescu has paid three official visits to the United States, most recently in April, 1978. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford visited Romania. Most-favored-nation status was granted in 1975 and trade reached toward the \$1 billion level in 1980. President Jimmy Carter dispatched Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal to Bucharest during the 1978 Romanian-Soviet crisis.

YUGOSLAVIA

(Continued from page 177)

and have become outspoken critics of the threat of Soviet intervention. An article in the Yugoslav newspaper *Politika* (August 25, 1980) characterized those Polish leaders ousted from party jobs as "proto-Stalinist" and out of phase with the workers' Solidarity movement. The Yugoslavs have generally praised the leadership of the Polish effort, referring to Lech Wałęsa, in particular, as "the tribune of the workers," and have stressed the importance of the Catholic Church in Poland.¹⁶ Significantly, the Yugoslav regime and the United States are in agreement on the Polish crisis and, specifically, on the seriousness of the threat of Soviet intervention in Poland. The Yugoslavs are likely to persist in supporting the Polish Solidarity movement.

CONCLUSION

Recently, the Yugoslav political order has been relying more on the permanence of key institutions than on the strength of personalities. A focus on institutional stability suggests a new political style, different from the style usually associated with Communist systems.¹⁷ This style seeks to control the excesses of "leaderism" and its ills and requires the recruitment of younger elements into the party. Given the local leadership difficulties of the 1970's, the young have not sought out the party as a career track, a recruitment problem discussed in the highest LCY councils. In addition, the new leadership is expected to stress the objectivity of procedural and institutional norms, while deemphasizing the organizationally dependent and ambitious "political personality." The substantive leadership commitment remains the same, namely, to the principle of nonalignment in foreign affairs, to the workers' self-management system, and to collective decision-making, both in the state presidency and in the party presidium.¹⁸

Consistent with the emphasis on collective decision in both party and state, there has been a rapid increase

¹⁶Facts on File, vol. 40, September 5, 1980, p. 659; Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Diplomat Extols Polish Workers' Patriotism," RAD Background Report/223 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, September 18, 1980.

¹⁷Slobodan Stankovic, "How Should Collective Leadership in Yugoslavia Function After Tito?" RAD Background Report/67 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, March 25, 1980.

¹⁸See Report to the Eleventh Party Congress: Josip Broz Tito, "The LCY in the Struggle for the Further Development of Socialist Self-Managing and Non-Aligned Yugoslavia," *Socialist Thought and Practice* (June, 1978), pp. 3-86.

¹⁹On changing party membership, see Slobodan Stankovic, "A Survey of Yugoslav Party Membership," RAD Background Report/152 (Yugoslavia), *Radio Free Europe Research*, June 23, 1980.

in LCY membership, with a rise to the 2-million level in 1980.¹⁹ Enlarged party rolls are consistent with the emphasis on institutional process and on the need to involve the country's youth in the political system. The expanded and more visible political roles for the party and the military, coupled with the principle of the "collective" institutions established by Tito, are the characteristic features of the Yugoslav system.

In light of the ethno-regional complexities and internal tensions that define Yugoslavia, it comes as no surprise that the Yugoslav Marxist variant underscores institutional permanence and stability. As of this writing, the Yugoslav system after Tito is functioning with remarkable calm and striking effectiveness, although only time will reveal whether it will endure. The Yugoslav combination of Marxist-defined goals and an institutionalized conflict process represents a unique form of Communist order. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 178)

Randolph Braham tells the history of the Jewish community in Hungary. Region by region, in the greatest detail, he tells of the destruction of this community after the German occupation of Hungary in March, 1944, during World War II. This genocide was called by Winston Churchill "probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the history of the world." O.E.S.

THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNIST EDUCATION. By Margrete Siebert Klein. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 174 pages, appendices, bibliography, references, tables and index, \$15.00.)

Margrete Klein was the first American given official permission to visit and study an East German pedagogical university. She evaluates the educational system that is based on the ideologies of Marx and Lenin, the professional qualifications of its teachers, and the ultimate goal of the system—to educate "its young people to become viable members of a technological society with the goal of supporting the GDR's long-range ideological and economic goals." O.E.S.

WOMEN IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Tova Yedlin. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980. 299 pages, bibliography, and index, \$19.95.)

The editor has selected the articles for this work from among the papers presented at the Conference on Women in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, held at the University of Alberta, Canada, in 1978.

O.E.S. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of February, 1981, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Middle East

Feb. 8—In a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat says that he continues to support the Camp David accords in preference to other methods for achieving peace in the Middle East.

Feb. 10—Egyptian President Sadat addresses the European Parliament in Luxembourg and encourages the members to undertake a peace initiative in the Middle East to supplement the Camp David accords.

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Feb. 26—Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, OAU foreign ministers agree on economic and military measures to pressure South Africa to negotiate on South-West Africa (Namibia).

Organization of American States (OAS)

Feb. 2—in Washington, D.C., the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States hold an emergency session to discuss the border war between Ecuador and Peru; the countries are presenting conflicting claims.

Persian Gulf Crisis

Feb. 2—An Iranian military official reports that Iran is beginning a major offensive against Iraqi forces and Kurdish insurgents in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan provinces.

Feb. 17—Special U.N. envoy Olof Palme arrives in Baghdad in another attempt to work out a cease-fire between Iraqi and Iranian forces.

Feb. 19—in Teheran, Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr meets with U.N. envoy Olof Palme.

Feb. 28—in Teheran, a 12-member delegation of Islamic nation officials arrive for talks with Iran's President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Rajai on how to resolve the fighting between Iran and Iraq.

United Nations

(See also *Intl. Persian Gulf Crisis*)

Feb. 11—U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appoints Javier Pérez de Cuellar as his special representative to promote negotiations among "all parties" to end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Feb. 25—the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization reports that although Cambodians are no longer starving, Cambodia needs some \$235 million in food aid in 1981.

AFGHANISTAN

(See *Intl. U.N.*)

ARGENTINA

Feb. 28—A U.S. State Department spokesman announces that 8 leading members of the human rights commission in Argentina were arrested last night and are being held

in police custody; the government gives no explanation for the arrests. Earlier in the month, the president of the Center for Legal and Social Studies testified in Geneva at the U.N. Human Rights Commission about the activities of the government's security agents and the thousands of people missing in the country.

BOLIVIA

Feb. 26—President Luis Garcia Meza removes Colonel Luis Arce Gomez as head of the Interior Ministry and the paramilitary security forces; 2 civilians are named to the previously all-military Cabinet.

CANADA

Feb. 3—The Manitoba provincial court of appeals rules 3 to 2 that the federal government has the right to change the federal constitution without provincial approval.

Feb. 9—The premiers of Manitoba, British Columbia, Alberta, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island announce their intention to ask the British government not to transfer the British North America Act of 1867 to Canada nor to transfer the power to amend it.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Feb. 1—in the first balloting in 15 years, a referendum is held on a new constitution that calls for a multiparty system of government.

CHILE

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

CHINA

Feb. 1—in Bangkok, China's Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang meets with Thai officials; this is Zhao's first foreign trip since he became Prime Minister.

Feb. 2—a spokesman for the Communist party says that political study sessions in factories and government offices will be resumed.

Feb. 6—in Beijing, party chairman Hua Guofeng makes his first public appearance since November 27, 1980; he is shown over national television attending a dinner for Vietnamese defector Hoang Van Hoan.

Feb. 28—Deputy Prime Minister Yao Yilin, head of the state planning commission, announces a \$9.8-billion cutback in government spending, primarily in capital construction, and an easing of controls over farm quotas; more emphasis will be placed on private initiative.

CUBA

(See also *El Salvador; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 13—in Havana, 21 Cubans take over the Ecuadorian embassy and hold the ambassador and 2 other diplomats hostage; they are demanding safe conduct out of the country.

Feb. 19—Cuban and Mexican officials sign an agreement; Mexico will purchase 100,000 tons of Cuban sugar.

Feb. 21—Cuban troops enter the Ecuadorian embassy and arrest the Cubans; no one is injured.

Feb. 22—in Washington, D.C., White House policy ad-

viser Edwin Meese 3d warns Cuba that the U.S. "will take the necessary steps to keep the peace any place in the world and that includes El Salvador," if Cuba does not halt arms shipments to El Salvadoran guerrillas.

ECUADOR

(See *Intl., OAS; Cuba; Peru*)

EGYPT

(See *Intl., Middle East; France*)

EL SALVADOR

(See also *Cuba, U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 1—In Washington, D.C., Robert E. White is relieved of his duties as U.S. ambassador to El Salvador; White has publicly opposed increases in U.S. military aid without adequate nonmilitary aid.

Feb. 3—Frederic L. Chapin, a career diplomat, is named by U.S. President Ronald Reagan as acting ambassador to replace White.

Feb. 5—*The New York Times* reports that secret documents reportedly seized from leftist guerrillas by U.S. intelligence agents show that last year the Soviet Union and Cuba agreed to supply the guerrillas with weapons from stockpiles of U.S. arms taken over by Vietnam and Ethiopia.

Feb. 11—It is reported in Managua that the Nicaraguan Sandinist government has told leftist guerrillas in El Salvador that they cannot expect additional military aid from Nicaragua; the U.S. government claims to have "overwhelming evidence" of Nicaraguan support for the leftists and is threatening to cut off U.S. aid for Nicaragua.

Feb. 14—In Washington, D.C., Minister Counselor of the Soviet Embassy Vladilen M. Vasev denies U.S. charges that the Soviet Union has been supplying arms to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador; but he says that Soviet arms are sent to Cuba and Ethiopia without any restrictions on transshipment.

Feb. 16—In Bonn, a U.S. delegation led by Lawrence Eagleburger meets with German Foreign Ministry officials to seek their support for U.S. policies in El Salvador. Eagleburger is also expected to meet with foreign ministry officials of U.S. allies in West Europe.

Feb. 20—In San Salvador, President José Napoleón Duarte says that his country needs economic aid far more than military aid; he says that his military is capable of handling the guerrillas if arms shipments from Communist nations cease.

Feb. 21—It is reported that liberal spokesman Colonel Arnoldo Majano has been under arrest since February 18; he went into hiding when he was ousted from the ruling junta 2 months ago.

Feb. 23—In Washington, D.C., a U.S. State Department spokesman claims that Soviet arms shipments through Nicaragua have slowed down; the department makes public the documents seized from Salvadoran guerrillas that purportedly show that Cuba, the Soviet Union and other Communist nations are trying to undermine El Salvador's military-backed government.

President of the Democratic Revolutionary Front Guillermo Manuel Lingo, a guerrilla leader, again calls for talks with representatives from the Reagan administration.

Feb. 26—In a statement made public today in Mexico City, Shafik Jorge Randal, secretary general of El Salvador's Communist party, emphatically denies the validity of the report being circulated by the U.S. State Department

that purports to show an agreement among Communist nations to supply arms to Salvadoran rebels.

U.S. State Department spokesman William J. Dyess says the rebels should negotiate with the Salvadoran government and not with the U.S.

Feb. 27—It is reported that there are now 20 U.S. military noncombatant technicians serving in El Salvador; 5 more are expected there within the next few days.

FRANCE

(See also *West Germany*)

Feb. 1—A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry confirms reports that France has turned four 60 F-1 Mirage jet fighter bombers over to Iraq; the jets were ordered by Iraq in 1977 before the fighting between Iran and Iraq began.

Feb. 11—Egyptian President Anwar Sadat arrives in Paris for a private visit; he is greeted at the airport by French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

GERMANY, WEST

Feb. 6—In Paris, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing conclude 2 days of talks; when the conference ends, both leaders express support for U.S. President Reagan.

Feb. 21—In Bonn, Schmidt says that President Reagan's economic policies may result in worldwide inflation if tax cuts are not accompanied by severe spending cuts.

In Munich, the Radio Free Europe broadcasting studio is damaged by an explosion; 8 people are injured and broadcasting is temporarily suspended.

GUATEMALA

Feb. 17—Amnesty International accuses Romeo Lucas García's government of directly supervising an intelligence unit that carries out political assassinations; Amnesty International says that since June, 1978, more than 5,000 people have been "seized without warrant and killed," allegedly by government-sponsored forces.

GUYANA

Feb. 15—A team of foreign observers says the general election in December, 1980, was "rigged massively and flagrantly."

INDIA

Feb. 4—India's Atomic Energy Commission announces its decision to reprocess spent uranium into plutonium oxide because the U.S. has delayed releasing nuclear fuel to India despite the fact that the U.S. agreed to do so when U.S. companies contracted to build the Tarapur plant.

IRAN

(See also *Intl., Persian Gulf Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 4—In Washington, D.C., U.S. State Department spokesman William J. Dyess says that Mohi Sobhani, an Iran-born U.S. citizen, was released from an Iranian jail last night; Sobhani had been held on espionage charges since September 6, 1980.

Religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini asks the political factions of Western-oriented President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and his rival, conservative Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Rajai, to work together and to stop the political quarreling.

Feb. 5—23 members of Parliament ask for a debate on their "doubts and questions" about the Iranian-American hostage agreement.

Feb. 6—In Teheran, revolutionary guards break up a

demonstration by Marxists-Leninists who are defying a government ban; right-wing fundamentalists take part in the attack on the leftists.

Feb. 10—U.S. free-lance journalist Cynthia B. Dwyer is released from jail and is ordered to leave the country; last week an Iranian court found her guilty of espionage and ordered her expulsion.

Feb. 11—On the 2d anniversary of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini warns the clergy to stay out of government affairs.

Feb. 18—40 members of Parliament warn of impending anarchy if the growing extremist street violence is not stopped.

Feb. 23—Prosecutor General Ali Qoddousi outlaws the Anglican Church in Iran; he says that 3 Britons associated with the church and held since last August will be released soon.

Feb. 26—In a letter signed by 133 intellectuals, the government is accused of torturing political prisoners and of making "consistent and increasing attacks upon democratic rights and liberties." This is the 2d accusation of government torture tactics made by intellectuals in the last 10 days.

Feb. 27—3 of 4 Britons who have been held captive on spy charges since August leave the country.

IRAQ

(See *Intl., Persian Gulf Crisis; Lebanon*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl., Middle East*)

Feb. 10—Parliamentary elections are set for June 30.

Feb. 11—The U.N. Commission on Human Rights votes 31 to 3, with 8 abstentions, to condemn Israel's policies toward Arabs in the occupied territories.

Feb. 13—The Israeli military reports that a Syrian MiG was shot down over the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon today.

Feb. 15—The Supreme Court approves the government takeover of the Arab-owned East Jerusalem Electric Company; the Court blocks the government takeover of an Arab-owned electric company franchise on the West Bank.

Feb. 25—Head of the settlement department Mattiyahu Drobless announces plans to increase the Jewish settler population of the occupied West Bank by 40 percent in 1981; an additional 8,000 Jews are expected to resettle there by the summer.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 2—in Washington, D.C., President Chun Doo Hwan meets with U.S. President Ronald Reagan; President Reagan agrees to normalize relations between the two countries; President Jimmy Carter severed diplomatic relations with South Korea 6 months ago because of the imposition of martial law and the imprisonment of political opposition leaders.

Feb. 25—The electoral college overwhelmingly elects President Chun Doo Hwan to serve a 7-year term as President.

KUWAIT

Feb. 24—in yesterday's nationwide parliamentary elections, conservatives defeat radical Arab nationalists.

LEBANON

Feb. 6—in Beirut, Jordanian chargé d'affaires Hisham al-

Mohaisen is kidnapped by gunmen; Jordanian officials accuse Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's brother, Riffat, of carrying out the abduction.

Feb. 27—in Beirut, terrorists assassinate Iraqi embassy officials Mohammed Khodeir and Kamel Abbas while they are riding in the ambassador's car.

LIBERIA

Feb. 20—in Lagos, Nigeria, the government news agency reports that 42 prominent Liberians have been released from prison; they were taken captive by the army last April during the coup d'état.

MEXICO

(See also *Cuba*)

Feb. 19—3 days after U.S. representatives met with Foreign Ministry officials to inform them of Cuban and Soviet involvement in El Salvador, Mexican President José López Portillo says that Cuba is the Latin American country "most dear" to Mexico.

NICARAGUA

(See also *El Salvador*)

Feb. 10—in Washington, D.C., the State Department delays the \$9.6-million sale of U.S. wheat to Nicaragua until an investigation of Nicaraguan arms shipments to El Salvador is completed.

NORWAY

Feb. 4—Labor party leader Gro Harlem Brundtland is installed as Prime Minister; her 17-member Cabinet includes 4 women.

PERU

(See also *Intl., OAS*)

Feb. 1—E.S.I.-Peru, the country's official press agency, announces a cease-fire between the forces of Peru and Ecuador in the 5-day-old border conflict.

Feb. 21—Sporadic fighting is reported along the contested border between Peru and Ecuador in the Cordillera del Condor.

PHILIPPINES

(See *Vatican*)

POLAND

Feb. 1—Lech Walesa, chairman of the National Coordinating Commission and the independent trade union Solidarity, calls off a one-hour strike set for tomorrow to support private farmers who are demanding an independent union; the government sends representatives to Rzeszow to meet with the farmers.

Feb. 3—Communist party leader Stanislaw Kania says that instigators are trying to create anarchy by transforming Solidarity, the independent union, into a political opposition.

Feb. 4—in Bielsko-Biala, wildcat strikes continue for the 9th day; union members are demanding the resignations of government officials thought to be corrupt. Talks break off between government and union representatives.

Feb. 9—the Central Committee of the Polish Communist party dismisses Prime Minister Jozef Pinkowski from his post and replaces him with Defense Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski.

Feb. 10—the Supreme Court rules that farmers do not have the right to organize into unions because they are self-employed and not employees.

Feb. 11—Parliament confirms the appointment of Jaruzelski as Prime Minister.

Feb. 12—In his first public appearance as Prime Minister, Jaruzelski calls for a 90-day moratorium on strikes, announces changes in the Cabinet, and promises that economic conditions will change.

Feb. 14—Following a meeting with government officials, Lech Walesa says he is "confident everything will work out" and that the union can cooperate with the new government for a moratorium on strikes.

Feb. 15—Party leader Kania flies to Prague to meet with Czechoslovak party chief Gustav Husak.

Feb. 17—Party leader Kania arrives in East Germany for talks with East German leader Erich Honecker.

Feb. 18—Striking students at the University of Lodz end their 26-day sit-in after they reach an agreement with the government; students will be permitted to form their own unions, and will have freedom of choice of language study and some flexibility in course offerings.

Feb. 20—Farmers in Rzeszow and Ustrzyki Dolne end their sit-ins at government office buildings after reaching an agreement with the government on the price of farm produce and on questions of local administration.

Feb. 22—Prime Minister Jaruzelski and party leader Kania leave for Moscow to attend the 26th party congress.

Feb. 26—The U.S. State Department announces that it will extend for 4 more months a repayment schedule for a \$88-million loan.

SAUDI ARABIA

Feb. 18—In a "gesture of goodwill" toward the administration of U.S. President Reagan, Crown Prince Fahd orders the release of all 21 U.S. prisoners in Saudi jails.

SOUTH AFRICA

Feb. 7—In Cape Town, a racially mixed President's Council begins discussion on the format for a new constitution; blacks refuse to join the council.

SPAIN

Feb. 9—The Union of the Democratic Center's executive committee selects Deputy Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo as the party's candidate to succeed former Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez who resigned January 30.

Feb. 10—King Juan Carlos asks Calvo Sotelo to form a new government.

Feb. 14—Basque nationalists call for a general strike to protest the death of a nationalist, José Ignacio Arregui Izaguirre, who died yesterday while in police custody.

Feb. 17—Interior Minister Juan José Rosón reports the resignations of National Police Director José Manuel Blanco and 5 other top police officials, following accusations of police torture in the death of Arregui.

Feb. 23—In Madrid, Civil Guards under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molino seize the Congress of Deputies by force and take 347 deputies hostage; troops take over the Madrid television station. Valencia military leader Lieutenant General Jaime Milans del Bosch proclaims a state of emergency.

In full military regalia, King Juan Carlos addresses the nation over television; he orders the uprising quashed and expresses his commitment to the democratic system.

Military commanders throughout the country proclaim their loyalty to the constitution and take steps to quell the uprising.

Feb. 24—After 18 hours, the Civil Guard releases its hostages; the military involved in the attempted takeover surrender to authorities.

Feb. 25—Parliament reconvenes and endorses Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo as Prime Minister.

Army deputy chief of staff General Alfonso Armada Comyn is dismissed for his role in the abortive coup; Lieutenant General Jaime Milans del Bosch is arrested and jailed for his part.

Feb. 26—Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo announces the members of his all-civilian Cabinet.

Feb. 27—In the aftermath of the coup attempt, millions of people throughout the country demonstrate their support of the King and the democratic system.

Feb. 28—ETA, the Basque separatist organization, declares "an unconditional cease-fire" in its war with the Civil Guards and releases the 3 consuls it has held captive for 3 days.

TAIWAN

Feb. 13—The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission gives approval to 3 nuclear reactor manufacturers to export reactors to Taiwan.

TURKEY

Feb. 6—Deputy security chief of Istanbul Mahmut Dikler and an aide are shot to death by terrorists.

Feb. 22—4 U.S. citizens are released from Turkish jails after serving more than 8 years on drug charges.

U.S.S.R

(See also *El Salvador; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 8—*Pravda*, the Soviet newspaper, accuses the administration of U.S. President Reagan of "whipping up the myth of a Soviet military threat" in order "to neutralize public dissatisfaction" over the state of the U.S. economy.

Feb. 18—The government press agency Tass accuses U.S.-sponsored radio stations in West Europe of broadcasting directives to dissidents in Poland.

Feb. 21—2 days before the opening of the Communist party's 26th congress in Moscow, Defense Minister Marshal Dmitri F. Ustinov accuses the West of trying to destroy détente.

Feb. 23—In Moscow, the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist party convenes, with more than 5,000 delegates in attendance.

In an address to the congress, President Leonid I. Brezhnev proposes a summit-level conference with U.S. President Reagan.

Feb. 24—In an address to the Soviet Congress, Polish Communist party leader Stanislaw Kania says his government will stop the "counterrevolutionary forces" trying to "sow anarchy" in Poland.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 12—In London, Rupert Murdoch, Australian newspaper publisher, reaches an agreement with the British newspaper unions and assumes full control of *The Times* (London); he reportedly paid \$28 million for the newspaper and its affiliated publications.

Feb. 17—Nearly 30,000 coal miners go on strike in South Wales to protest the Coal Board's closing of several mines.

UNITED STATES

Administration

(See also *West Germany*)

Feb. 2—Secretary of Education T.H. Bell revokes proposed

regulations requiring public school districts with more than 25 foreign-speaking students to teach those students in their native language; he calls the proposed regulations "harsh, . . . unworkable and incredibly costly."

Feb. 5—In an address to the nation, President Ronald Reagan says "We are threatened with an economic calamity of tremendous proportions and the old business as usual treatment can't save us." He asks "support for sweeping spending and tax cuts."

Under court order, the Labor Department announces that coal miners must be provided with emergency breathing equipment starting February 25.

Vice President George Bush swears in Raymond J. Donovan as Secretary of Labor and Jeane J. Kirkpatrick as chief U.S. delegate to the U.N.

Spokesman for the Cuban-Haitian Task Force Robert L. Bowen reports that it cost the government about \$532 million to process some 125,000 Cuban and 12,400 Haitian refugees entering the U.S. in the last year.

Feb. 7—The White House announces that Fred C. Iklé will be selected by President Reagan as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Feb. 9—The Department of Energy announces plans to buy 20,000 barrels of crude oil a day on the spot market for the strategic petroleum reserve.

Feb. 10—President Reagan announces the creation of a 12-member Economic Policy Advisory Board, headed by former Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz; the board will report to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and will advise the President on economic matters.

Feb. 11—After 5 years of study, the Federal Trade Commission stops its attempts to regulate the advertising of over-the-counter nonprescription drugs.

President Reagan appoints Californian William A. Wilson as his personal representative to the Vatican and Leonore Annenberg as White House chief of protocol.

Feb. 12—President Reagan selects Angela M. Buchanan as Treasurer of the United States and Lionel H. Olmer as Under Secretary of Commerce for international trade.

The Department of Energy reports that on January 19, the day he left office, outgoing special counsel to the Department of Energy Paul Bloom gave 4 charities some \$4 million to help the needy pay their fuel bills; the \$4 million was interest accruing on a \$100-million settlement reached in an overcharging case against the Standard Oil Company of Indiana.

Feb. 18—Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., issues a statement saying that "having considered all the circumstances carefully, we have decided to approve implementation of the agreements [to obtain release of the hostages] in strict accordance with the terms of the agreements." The statement adds that the Reagan administration would not have negotiated with Iran for the release of the hostages.

Speaking to a joint session of Congress in a televised address, President Ronald Reagan urges the adoption of an economic program designed to curb inflation and unemployment and to restore the nation to fiscal stability. The President proposes a \$659.5-billion budget for fiscal 1982 with a deficit of \$45 billion; cuts of some \$41.4 billion in 83 major programs are proposed, with a 10 percent annual tax cut for individuals over the next 3 years beginning July 1; tax incentives to encourage business are included; only Defense Department appropriations are to be increased.

Feb. 19—The White House announces the appointment of John Behan, a Vietnam war veteran, as head of the Veterans Administration, John S.R. Shad as chairman of

the Securities and Exchange Commission, Ann Gorsuch as administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and M. Michael Cardenas as chief of the Small Business Administration.

The Postal Rate Commission approves a 3-cent rise to 18 cents an ounce in first-class postage; the Postal Service had asked for a rise to 20 cents. The commission proposed a 27-percent increase in charges for service to weekly "high priority" customers like newsmagazines.

Feb. 22—According to information disclosed today, President Reagan filed a financial disclosure statement for 1980 and up to January 20, 1981; his net worth is estimated at about \$4 million.

Feb. 24—President Reagan signs an executive order that suspends lawsuits involving claims against Iran if they qualify for international arbitration.

Meeting in Washington, D.C., state governors vote 36 to 2 to endorse President Reagan's budget cuts "subject to various conditions." Only 38 governors vote.

Feb. 25—Saying that the growth in government spending for fiscal 1982 was mistakenly undercalculated, the White House reports that President Reagan has ordered an additional \$3 billion-\$6 billion cut from the 1982 budget.

Feb. 27—Office of Management and Budget director David Stockman reports that President Reagan has ordered an additional \$13 billion in budget cuts for fiscal 1982; this figure includes the \$3 billion-\$6 billion in additional cuts announced February 25.

Congressional and Defense Department sources disclose that, in the military budget for fiscal 1982, President Reagan will ask Congress for funds to return 2 World War II battleships to service as quickly as possible.

Economy

Feb. 6—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate remained unchanged at 7.4 percent in January.

Feb. 13—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.9 percent in January.

Feb. 23—Most major banks lower their prime interest rate to 19 percent; Morgan Guaranty Trust lowered its rate on February 9.

Feb. 25—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.7 percent in January.

Feb. 27—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators fell 0.4 percent in January.

The Commerce Department reports a \$5.44-billion trade deficit in January.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Cuba; El Salvador; Mexico; Nicaragua; Poland; Taiwan; U.S.S.R.*)

Feb. 2—Acting State Department spokesman William J. Dyess confirms that the White House has asked Congress to delay release of its annual report on worldwide human rights violations to avoid embarrassing visiting South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan; South Korea is criticized in the report, which deals with some 160 countries.

At a White House news conference, President Reagan says that "anytime they [Soviet leaders] want to sit down and discuss a legitimate reduction of nuclear weapons I would be willing to get into such negotiations."

Feb. 3—Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger tells a Pentagon news conference that he favors the production

- and deployment of the neutron bomb; he also says that should the Israelis request the stationing of U.S. forces in Israel "we would certainly consider a request."
- Feb. 5—The State Department reports that Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., has advised the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies that the U.S. has made no decision on the neutron bomb and will consult with them before making such a decision.
- Feb. 20—State Department spokesman William Dyess reports that the ban on Export-Import Bank financing of Chilean purchases from the U.S. is ended; the ban was imposed in November, 1979.
- Feb. 21—Deputy Secretary of State Frank C. Carlucci tells the NATO allies that they must increase their contributions to European security and "build up their military and political ramparts well beyond Europe, particularly in the strategic Persian Gulf region," if they want an enhanced U.S. military presence in Europe.
- Feb. 23—The State Department makes public some 19 documents, allegedly captured from guerrilla forces in El Salvador by government forces, which support U.S. claims that the guerrillas are receiving Communist-bloc support in their effort to "impose a Communist regime with no popular support" on El Salvador.
- Feb. 25—Senator Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) says he would support President Reagan in sending as many as 150 non-combatant military advisers to El Salvador.
- Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Walter Stoessel, Jr., tells the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the U.S. is "urgently upgrading" security at some 24 U.S. embassies.
- Feb. 27—Secretary of State Haig says that Cuban activity in supplying arms to the El Salvadoran guerrillas is "not acceptable in this hemisphere. . ." He threatens to deal with this arms flow at its source.
- Feb. 28—in Washington, D.C., President Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher discuss the possibility of including a British unit in the U.S. rapid deployment force for use in the Persian Gulf region.

Labor and Industry

- Feb. 2—General Motors Corporation reports its first full year's loss since 1921, a \$763-million loss for 1980.
- Feb. 19—The Ford Motor Company reports a corporate loss of \$1.5 billion for 1980.
- Feb. 23—General Motors Corporation recalls some 6.4 million intermediate-size cars of the 1978-early 1981 model years; 2 bolts in the rear suspension must be replaced.
- Feb. 27—The Chrysler Corporation reports a record \$1.71-billion loss for 1980.

Legislation

- Feb. 3—in a 80-17 vote, the Senate approves the nomination of Raymond J. Donovan as Secretary of Labor.
- Feb. 5—The House votes 305 to 104 to increase the temporary national debt limit \$50 billion, to \$985 billion.
- Feb. 6—The Senate votes 73 to 18 to approve the new national debt limit.

Military

- Feb. 9—Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announces that President Reagan will retain General David C. Jones as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Feb. 10—The Defense Department notifies Congress that the U.S. plans to sell some \$500 million worth of F-16 jet fighters to Austria; this is the 1st time planes are being sold to a neutral country.

Political Scandal

Feb. 4—U.S. district Judge John P. Fullam dismisses the contempt of court citation against *Philadelphia Inquirer* reporter Jan Schaffer for refusing to testify about her information source during the pretrial hearing of an Abscam case last July; she answered the relevant question today and the citation and 6-month jail term were dropped. The Supreme Court upheld the sentence on January 19.

Politics

Feb. 27—Charles Manatt is selected as the new chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

Supreme Court

Feb. 8—Addressing the American Bar Association in Houston, Texas, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger calls for a "damage control program" to fight increasing crime in American cities.

Feb. 23—in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court upholds a New York state law that limits the sale of savings bank life insurance to residents and workers in New York state.

Feb. 25—By a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court overrules the Wisconsin Supreme Court and upholds the right of the Democratic party to refuse to seat delegates to its national convention if they have not been chosen according to the party rules.

In a 7-2 ruling, the Supreme Court upholds the Securities and Exchange Commission's standards of proof necessary to prove a securities fraud—"the preponderance of evidence."

VATICAN

Feb. 16—Pope John Paul II arrives in Karachi, Pakistan, at the beginning of his 12-day Asian tour.

Feb. 17—Pope John Paul arrives in Manila, the Philippines; he is greeted at the airport by Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his wife.

Pope John Paul delivers a homily on human rights; President Marcos sits beside him.

Feb. 23—Pope John Paul arrives in Tokyo for a 5-day visit; he is the first Pope to visit Japan.

Feb. 26—Pope John Paul addresses a crowd in Anchorage, Alaska, his final stop before returning to Rome.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

Feb. 16—in Washington, D.C., the U.S. State Department announces that on February 8 the government of North Yemen released 2 U.S. citizens, William Thomas, Jr., and DuWayne Terell; they were held for a year on charges of being Israeli spies.

ZIMBABWE

Feb. 12—in Salisbury, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe orders the army to quash guerrillas loyal to Joshua Nkomo. There has been fighting between Mugabe supporters and Nkomo supporters for 6 days in the Bulawayo area.

Feb. 13—for the first time in a week, the highway between Bulawayo and Salisbury is open as fighting between guerrillas ceases; 150 people were reported killed in the most recent fighting between guerrillas and government forces.

Feb. 20—a government spokesman announces that the government will establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. ■



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